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Sharing Alike:
French Family Taxation as a Model for Reform
Ayla A. Lari"
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1994, the federal income tax code has specified the joint
return with dependency exemptions, supplemented by head of household
status, as the basic method for imposing the personal income tax and
recognizing taxpayers' family responsibilities. The original system has
evolved through a process of legislative accretion, yet its essential ele-
ments have remained unchanged. The tax law codifies and reinforces
outdated social norms that assume that all taxpayers are heterosexual
married couples with one earner and one homemaker. The definition of
the taxable unit in the personal income tax code and the method of im-
posing the tax have historically been popular subjects of scholarly and
political debate. Both issues have been the subject of renewed debate and
changing understanding in light of new scholarship that has introduced
theories of family economics and feminism to the tax scholarship. Dra-
matic changes that have taken place within American families since the
introduction of the joint return have not been recognized or accommo-
dated by the tax code despite their powerful effects on our social and
economic lives.
This article provides a comprehensive consideration of an alterna-
tive method of taxing personal income in the family that has been Jm-
plemented in France. The alternative method studied incorporates two
0 The author received a J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1997 and a B.S.E. from Princeton
University in 1994. A draft of this article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for a J.D. degree at Harvard Law School. The author thanks Amy Burns, David Salvucci,
and Shaheen, Omar, and Hamid Lari for their support and encouragement.
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critical differences from the U.S. method of taxation-aggregation of
family income and a application of universal rate structure for all taxable
units. Under the French method, the tax is imposed by applying a single
rate schedule to each family member's portion of the total family income.
The French system provides conceptual unity, as well as flexibility, and
relative simplicity.
Radical changes in the actual demographic makeup of families in
the United States, continuing changes in family law, and changes in pub-
lic perception and understanding of the family as a social institution pro-
vide fertile ground for discussion and reevaluation of the family concept
embodied in the tax code. The nuclear family paradigm may already be
obsolete. Since 1970, the number of single and divorced persons has
grown much more rapidly than has the number of married persons.' The
number of unmarried couples has grown more than sevenfold! Families
have become smaller, with more single parents as heads of household and
more working mothers.' People are living in increasingly complex and
nontraditional households.4
Marriage, in particular, is diminishing in its importance as a signifier
of a specific social relationship. The meaning of marriage itself has
changed profoundly. Fewer people choose to acknowledge their relaticn-
ships through marriage,5 and, for many, marriage has become a transitory
relationship. Furthermore, traditional notions of marriage are being
challenged by same-sex marriage, likely to be legalized in Hawaii in the
near future, with consequences anticipated throughout the United
States.6 In response to objections to same-sex marriage, Congress passed
and President Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act, barring fed-
eral recognition of same-sex marriages and withholding federal tax bere-
fits from same-sex couples This legislation may well be unconstitutional
1. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1996 Table 58 (116th
ed.).
2. Id. at Table 61. The Census Bureau defines "unmarried couple" as two unrelated adults
of the opposite sex sharing the same household.
3. Peter Kilborn, Shifts in Families Reach a Plateau, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1996, at
A18. See Bureau of the Census, Head Count: The Changing American Household (1996).
4. U.S. Bureau of the Census, supra note 1, at Tables 66-69.
5. Id. at Tables 146-150.
6. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), on remand, Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394 (D.
Haw. Dec. 3, 1996) (finding no state interest in opposing same-sex marriage). In response, the
Hawaii legislature has recently drafted a proposed constitutional amendment that would restrict
marriage to opposite-sex, heterosexual couples. H.B. 117, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1997).
Thus, closure on this issue has not yet been achieved.
7. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Star. 2419 (1996) (to be codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C.
1238(c)).
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on federalism and equal protection grounds, and popular opinion may be
more progressive than popular rhetoric would allow. Consequently,
same-sex marriage may soon become a part of our social landscape. Un-
married couples, gay couples, and single individuals are having children
in increasing numbers.8 Despite this rearrangement of the composition of
households, marriage is an enduring institution and the reconfigured
family remains the center of our lives, including our economic and pro-
ductive lives.
Despite these widespread changes, reconceiving our notions of fam-
ily has proven more difficult, perhaps because "new" families are not ca-
pable of the type of closed definitions with which we are most comfort-
able. Today's families are often amorphous by traditional standards, with
complex configurations, roles, and hierarchies that are not capable of
easy categorization and labeling. Tax law should reflect our changing
understanding, for tax law does shape and constrain our choices and en-
trench our outdated models of family and family behavior, however sub-
tly. Some scholars even advocate a proactive role for the tax code, be-
yond merely reflecting social change; these scholars would employ the
tax code to overcome and transform social biases concerning family work
and gender.9 Although achieving consensus regarding the appropriate
normative social goals to pursue through the tax code may be difficult,
the tax code should be cognizant of social reality in order to achieve fair-
ness, efficiency, and legitimacy.
Politically, the current tax system is a popular target for both legiti-
mate and demagogic calls for reform. The realities that the gap between
the rich and poor is growing and that current and future generations will
not experience the same prosperity and economic security as have their
parents are becoming widely appreciated. Economic dissatisfaction for
some makes the tax system an easy target for popular discontent and po-
litical manipulation and posturing. Frustration with the complexity of the
tax code and with the arbitrariness of tax burdens also motivates propcs-
als for tax reform.
Traditional tax commentators have focused on the distributional
effects of various tax proposals. More recent exploration of the tax code
has been broader in scope and considered its role in governing behavior
and shaping economic and personal decisions. This modern analysis has
focused on the social and economic consequences of the incentive
8. Carole Paquette, Couples Wary on Same-Sex Adoptions, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1996, at
13LI.
9. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993).
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structures embedded in the tax code, many of which reinforce traditional
social norms with respect to the family and to women's acceptable roles.
This modem analysis has introduced research from other fields to the tax
scholarship. The new tax scholarship demands that the tax system move
beyond shortsighted distributive concerns about which group pays what
tax and take into account how real families actually function and how
the tax code affects people's choices in conjunction with other social and
economic pressures; 0 such factors include demands of the labor market-
place, pressures for gender specialization within the family, and existing
discriminatory social conditions, such as the gender wage gap.
Reform of the personal income tax has been a recurring topic among
U.S. tax scholars, many of whom have espoused certain proposals de-
signed to remedy particular perceived ills in the current tax system. As-
sessment of the joint return has been the dominant approach to discuss-
ing taxation of the family. Most proposals for reform are incremental in
nature, focusing on ways to address specific shortcomings identified in
the existing tax code, rather than comprehensive reconsiderations of
family taxation. For example, tax scholars concerned about secondary
earner bias have advocated individual filing as a way of alleviating bur-
densome marginal tax rates on the marginal earner in two-earner fani-
lies, mostly without evaluating the impact of individual filing on other
important tax considerations. Such piecemeal proposals range from in-
plementation of negative tax rates for secondary earners to payment of
fixed dependent credits and reintroduction of universal individual filing.
The basic methodology of the tax system-imposition of tax by different
rate tables on individual income or on joint income for married couples,
with deductions for dependents-has remained largely unquestioned.
This article revisits the viability of using the family unit as the basic
taxable unit for the personal income tax and comprehensively examines
one particular scheme that recognizes the family as the taxable unit. This
article investigates the French method of income taxation, which is based
on the quotient familial, as a possible reform model for the U.S. personal
income tax law. The proposed model would replace the joint return (as
well as the other filing statuses), tax tables, personal exemptions, and
dependency deductions with a unified method of taxation for all indi-
viduals by family or household. The analysis concludes that the French
model presents an attractive alternative with significant opportunities for
simplification and for accommodation of nontraditional, family-like ec-
nomic and living arrangements.
10. See id. at 983-85.
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Part II of this article presents a summary of the history and features
of the U.S. personal income tax system, focusing on taxation of the fam-
ily. Part III reviews important issues in redesigning the tax system and
evaluates existing proposals for reform that would affect family taxation.
Part IV describes in some detail the French tax code's method of family
taxation. Part V is an analysis of the French system and of possibilities for
its adaptation in the United States, with particular attention given to the
issues raised in Part III. Part VI presents a brief conclusion and assess-
ment of the proposed model's political viability.
II. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF FAMILY TAXATION IN THE
U.S. PERSONAL INCOME TAX
A. The Evolution of the Rate Tables
Although the tax code has been periodically revised, at times sub-
stantially, the current tax code follows the basic structure laid out in the
original post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax instituted in 1913. Since
its inauspicious beginnings, the individual income tax has become the
most significant single source of federal revenue. In 1989, personal in-
come taxation raised forty-five percent of federal revenue." From the
inception of the tax, the fundamental taxable unit of the personal income
tax in the United States has been the individual. From 1913 until 1948,
the individual was the sole unit of personal income taxation. All persons
were taxed as individuals, regardless of marital status or other family re-
lationships. Although married couples now have the option of filing joint
returns, the individual remains the primary taxable unit for most admin-
istrative purposes, as well as for income attribution and aggregation. All
income taxed to the individual by whom the income was originally re-
ceived or earned. That is, not only must individuals file separate tax re-
turns, they must include in their income all income they receive and may
not attribute income to another or have income attributed to them for
purposes of calculating the tax.
Progressivity is another key feature of the U.S. income tax. Progres-
sivity in taxation is represented by a scheme in which taxpayers with
greater incomes pay tax at higher rates. That is, income of taxpayers is
broken down into segments or tax brackets, and additional segments or
11. COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 39 (1991).
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brackets are taxed at higher rates than are previous segments of income.
As more income is added to the taxable unit, increasingly higher tax rates
apply to the incremental income. Progressivity of taxation reflects the
idea of diminishing returns or utility on increasing wealth. Despite the
centrality of progressive taxation in the U.S. tax scheme since its incep-
tion, progressivity remains the subject of lively debate among both tax
scholars and politicians, as evidenced by headline-grabbing discussion in
the 1996 U.S. presidential elections. Progressivity is a common element
of many highly criticized features of the U.S. tax code.
The Supreme Court's reinforcement of the principle of individual
taxation in Lucas v. Earl" was the first of a series of steps that resulted in
the introduction of the joint return in 1948. Earl held that income must
be "taxed to the tree from which it grew," regardless of any assignment of
that income to another taxpayer or other redirection of the income by
the earning taxpayer and regardless of the motivation for so channeling
the income. The primary motivation behind the Earl decision was con-
cern that, by strategically reassigning and attributing income within the
family, taxpayers could evade the progressive income tax scheme by
shifting income to taxpayers in lower tax brackets. By "sharing" income
with a spouse or with children and other dependents contractually as Earl
did, taxpayers could have substantially undermined the taxation system,
defeating progressivity and revenue collection while retaining both ccn-
trol and benefit of the income.
The Earl decision was an important step in protecting the integrity
of the tax code and preserving the intent of Congress with respect to the
structure of the personal income tax, but it also provided a challenge to
the ingenuity of taxpayers. Attribution of income and the definition of
the taxable unit become relevant in a progressive tax code because the
tax imposed on income depends on the other income of the taxable unit.
Under a progressive rate schedule with individual taxation, couples with
the same income have varying tax burdens depending on the distribution
of income within the couple. The tax burden is minimized when the in-
come of the spouses is approximately equal because the greatest benefit
of the lower tax brackets can be obtained; the tax burden is maximized
when all of the income of the couple is attributed to one spouse or the
other. Designation of taxable units will have a significant impact on tax
liability, depending on how much income splitting is allowed. Taxpayers
are driven to attribute or shift income to taxable units with lower in-
comes so long as they can recoup the benefit of the income.
12. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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The equilibrium created by the Earl decision was seriously damaged
by the decision in Poe v. Seaborn,13 decided just weeks later. In Seabom,
the taxpayer and his wife were residents of a community property state.
The income earned by the taxpayer was treated as belonging equally to
both spouses under state law. The income sharing entailed no assign-
ment, contract, or other voluntary arrangement-the division was po-
vided by property law. The family income primarily comprised the hus-
band's work earnings, plus income from the management of real estate,
but both the taxpayer and his wife reported half of the income on their
respective individual returns. After Earl the disallowance of this practice
seemed inevitable. However, the Court held that local law would apply
for federal tax purposes, emphasizing that the arrangement was provided
by state law and not by voluntary agreement-the income was never the
sole property of the taxpayer. For couples with equal-earning spouses, the
tax burden was the same regardless of marital status; however, for couples
with one spouse earning the majority of the income, the tax burden was
substantially reduced by the equal splitting of their income because those
couples gained the advantage of the doubled ceilings for the lower tax
brackets.
The acceptance of local marital property law for federal tax purposes
inevitably created a disparity between couples residing and filing tax re-
turns in community property states and those in noncommunity property
states. Those residing in community property states experienced an ad-
vantage in reduced progressivity and substantial resulting tax savings
from marriage. Those living in common law states were prohibited from
achieving the same result under Earl. Together, these decisions intro-
duced a significant nonuniformity into the federal tax code.
Concerned about the distortion produced by such an anomalous tax
structure- many states were transforming their property laws by creating
elective and, then, mandatory community property laws-Congress was
prompted to act. 4 To alleviate the unfairness of this geographically dis-
criminatory situation, Congress amended the tax code in 1948 to provide
for a joint return for married taxpayers in all states, in effect extending
the community property tax consequences to all married taxpayers. Since
the introduction of the joint return, the federal income tax has treated
the married couple as a single economic unit, reporting income and cal-
culating tax liability for both spouses together. The original joint return
computed the tax by combining the married taxpayers' income and ap-
13. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).




plying the same standard rate schedule as that for individual returns to
each half of their joint income. 5 The new system mimicked the commu-
nity property tax result so that the income of couples was taxed at the
same marginal rates as was the income of individuals but with each rate
bracket doubled. 6
Although most married taxpayers had enjoyed reduced tax liability
under the 1948 filing method, a new disparity had been created between
married and single taxpayers, whose tax burden was as much as 141% of
that of married couples with the same income." The single-filer and
joint-married-filer tax rate schedules remained coupled, i.e., differed by a
factor of two, until 1969, when Congress responded to the unequal tax
rates by instituting a new, more generous rate schedule for unmarried
individuals." In 1969, to reduce the inequity between married and un-
married taxpayers, Congress adjusted the rates for individual returns and
created separate rate schedules for single and married filers. The new rate
schedules reflected a compromise between the aim of equal treatment of
all married couples with the same income and the desire to mitigate
heavy tax burdens on individual taxpayers: the rate tables were set such
that the liability of an unmarried taxpayer would not exceed 120% of the
liability of a married couple with the same income.'9 Today, unmarried
taxpayers continue to file as individuals at the rate schedule set for indi-
viduals.'
The new rate structure necessarily reflected a compromise between
equal treatment of individuals and equal treatment of couples. For those
couples who continued to enjoy a tax advantage over singles with
equivalent incomes, that "marriage bonus" was rationalized on the basis
of the increased living expenses of couples. Despite potential economies
of scale, living as a couple is generally more expensive than is living as an
individual. The new tax structure also had an unintended negative cai-
sequence, now commonly known as "the marriage penalty." The terms
"marriage penalty" and "marriage bonus" refer to the violation of the
principle of marriage neutrality by the tax code: couples experience dif-
ferent tax burdens-either an increase, hence "penalty," or a decrease,
hence "bonus"--solely on the basis of their marital status. For some cou-
ples, in which one member did not earn a substantially disproportionate
15. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 301, 62 Star. 110 (1948).
16. Id.
17. S. REP. No. 91-552, at 260 (1969).
18. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803, 83 STAT. 487, 678-85 (1969).
19. Id. at 260-62.
20. I.R.C. § l(c) (West Supp. 1996). Unless otherwise noted all references in this paper are
to the 1996 version of the Internal Revenue Code.I
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amount of the joint income, the tax burden was increased after marriage
because they were deprived of the benefit of doubled tax brackets by the
new rate structure. Although, at the time of the 1969 rate structure's
enactment, the marriage penalty may have been rare, as more and more
couples become two-earner couples, the marriage penalty becomes an
increasingly troubling, common phenomenon rather than an oddity.
It is impossible to have an income tax with progressive marginal tax
rates and joint returns, for married couples and avoid marriage penalties
and bonuses. Marriage penalties and bonuses reflect the inherent conflict
between three important principles of taxation: progressivity, couples
neutrality, and marriage neutrality. Although the words "penalty" and
"bonus" seem to indicate deliberate differential treatment, the financial
consequences result from a choice between consistency among couples
and consistency among individuals. Hence, the inconsistency that mar-
riage can be both penalized and benefited results from an economic pd-
icy choice, not directly a social policy choice about marriage. This his-
torical accident of the joint return leads to troubling results.
Although commonly justified as recognition of the economic reality
of marriage, the creation of these statuses was primarily for political and
administrability concerns necessitated by the disparities in marital prop-
erty treatment between community property and common law states.
Nevertheless, the tax code currently encourages joint filing of tax returns
by married taxpayers, although it does allow married taxpayers to file
separately under a different rate schedule' In some unusual cases mar-
21. I.R.C. § I(a); I.R.C. § l(d). The 1996 rate schedules are as follows: 1996 Tax rate sched-
ules for single filers (I.R.C. § 1(c)):
If adjusted gross but less than the marginal rate







1996 Tax rate schedules for married filing separately (I.R.C. § 1 (d)):
If adjusted gross but less than the marginal rate
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tied taxpayers may prefer to file separately to obtain tax savings22 or for
other reasons; however, the tax rates are constructed to make joint filing
more attractive to married taxpayers. A couple may choose to be treated
as separate economic units but quite possibly will face a penalty for that
choice. The greatest disparity in tax burdens for filers with the same in-
come was, and still is, between married couples in which one individual
earned all of the marital income and individual filers.
In addition, in 1951, Congress introduced the head of household
status, creating a third, intermediate rate structure for those single tax-
payers with certain dependents.23  The rate brackets for head-of-
household filers were wider than were those for single filers to compen-
sate heads of households for their increased economic burdens.' Leaving
aside the marriage penalty situation, married couples retained an advan-
tage over head-of-household filers and an even more substantial advan-
tage over single filers in the rate structures.2 Single individuals qualify for
head of household status if they maintain their home as a household and
1996 Tax rate schedules for married filing jointly (I.R.C. §1 (a)):
If adjusted gross but less than the marginal tax







1996 Tax rate schedule for head of household (I.R.C. §1 (b)):
If adjusted gross but less than the marginal rate







These rates are from Internal Revenue Service, 1040 Instructions 53 (1996).
All tax tables are adjusted for inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index. I.R.C.
§1(). Inflation adjustments are made by altering tax brackets, not marginal tax rates.
22. In certain situations, it may be easier for taxpayers to meet floors that are fixed as a per-
centage of gross income if they file separately. They will then be able to take advantage of de-
ductions unavailable to them if they file jointly.
23. Revenue Act of 1951, § 301, 65 STAT. 452, 480-83 (1951).
24. I.R.C. § l(b); I.R.C. § 2(b).
25. Surviving spouses, individuals widowed in the last two years who maintain a household
for at least one dependent child, file under same table as married filing-jointly. I.R.C. §§ 1 (a),
§ 2(a).
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principal place of abode for at least one other dependent (i.e., a child or
parent of the taxpayer).26 Head of household status creates a large benefit
to the single taxpayer for his or her first dependent but no additional
benefit (beyond the personal exemptions) for additional dependents.
B. Other Aspects of Family Income Taxation
In addition to the differences built into the four separate rate sched-
ules, standard deductions also result in different tax treatment of indi-
viduals and married couples. For 1996 tax returns, the standard deduc-
tion for single filers was $4000; for head-of-household filers, $5900; and
for married couples filing jointly, $6700.27 Thus, the tax code reflects a
constant tension among the desire to treat couples consistently, the de-
sire to treat individuals consistently, and the attempt to equalize the dis-
parities while maintaining progressivity. The primary disparities between
individual and couple tax burdens can be linked directly to the computa-
tion of the tax through the rate schedules and the standard deduction,
although other provisions may also contribute to the differences.
Taxable income is a function of gross income reduced by personal
exemptions and by either the standard deduction or the itemized deduc-
tion. Thus, the tax code takes family responsibilities into account
through the operation of the tax savings of the personal and dependent
exemptions and deductions.2s The statute allows every taxpayer a single
personal exemption (or a double exemption for a married couple filing
jointly) and an additional exemption for each qualified dependent. For
1996 tax returns, the exemption was a deduction of $2250 from taxable
income for each qualified dependent of the taxpayer.29 Dependents are
themselves treated as separate taxpayers and must file separate tax re-
turns; however, individuals who are declared dependents on the tax ie-
turn of another individual may not also claim themselves as dependents
on their own tax return to get a double exemption? The standard de-
duction is also limited for a taxpayer who is claimed as a dependent on
another's tax return.31
26. I.R.C. § 2(b).
27. I.R.C. § 63(c).
28. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of the tax consequences of having chil-
dren, see Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 TAX L. REV. 349 (1994). Although
much of Zelenak's discussion is paralleled here, he affords the subject a much more thorough
treatment than the constraints of space will allow here.
29. Internal Revenue Service, supra note 21, at 12.
30. I.R.C. § 151(d) (2).
31. For 1996, the standard deduction for an individual who can be claimed as a dependent
on another person's tax return is generally limited to the larger of $650 or the individual's
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Personal exemptions, together with deductions, essentially define a
zero-rate bracket in the tax schedule. The actual tax savings from each
additional dependent vary with the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. Thus,
the tax savings per child will increase as the taxpayer's highest marginal
rate rises; however, for taxpayers with higher incomes, the exemption is
phased out and eventually becomes worthless.32 For taxpayers in the
highest rate bracket, the most the exemption could be worth is only
$89 1.3 Since the late 1940s, the tax burden on households with depend-
ents has grown disproportionately in comparison with households with-
out dependents. This is a result of the fact that tax exemptions for de-
pendents have not kept pace with income growth.' To be equivalent to
the 1948 exemption, the 1984 exemption should have been $5,600; in-
stead it was $1,000. 31 Changes in tax rate schedules and tax brackets
have not made any adjustments by family size or incorporated depend-
ents in any way. The tax savings achieved through personal exemptions
compensate only a fraction of the costs of raising children-the cost of
raising a child from birth to eighteen years of age has been estimated at
$60,000 to $80,000 in 1981 dollars.36 Attempts have been made to set
the total amount of tax-exempt income, either through deductions or
exemptions, equal to the poverty level, but Congress has rejected such
attempts on the basis that many taxpayers share expenses or homes even
if not married, thereby reducing their cost of living. Revenue pressures
may be the single most important factor preventing the enactment of
more generous deductions and exemptions.
The value of the dependency exemption is reduced for higher in-
come taxpayers through the application of a "phaseout" provision. The
phaseout also creates "rate bubbles" in which marginal rates are higher
than the highest marginal rates listed in the tax tables as the phaseout is
carried out but return to the tax table's highest rates upon completion of
the phaseout. The phaseout of the dependency tax exemption benefit is
calculated by reducing the amount of the personal exemption by two
earned income for the year up to the standard deduction amount of $4000. Treas. Dep't, I.R.S.,
Tax Rules for Children and Dependents (Publication 929) 5 (1996).
32. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3).
33. The exemption is $2250. Internal Revenue Service, supra note 21, at 12. The highest
rate bracket is 39.6%. I.R.C. § 1(b). The maximum possible tax savings resulting from an ex-
emption is $2250 X .396 = $891. This savings is reduced as a result of the high-income de-
pendency-exemption phaseout.
34. EUGENE STEUERLE, THE TAX TREATMENT OF HOUSEHOLD OF DIFFERENT SIZE, TAXING
THE FAMILY 73 (Rudolph G. Penner ed., 1983).
35. Id. at 74.
36. ALESSANDRO CIGNO, ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 93 (Oxford Clarendon Press 1991).
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percent for each $2500 increment of adjusted gross income in excess of a
threshold phaseout amount.37 The threshold phaseout amounts vary with
filing status: in 1996, for single taxpayers, the threshold was $117,950; for
heads of household, $147,450; and for married couples, $176,950.
The definition of dependent in the tax code is relatively expansive
and imposes five conditions that must be met by the putative dependent:
(1) relationship; (2) not filing jointly with spouse if married; (3) citizen or
resident of the United States; (4) income; and (5) support.38 The term
"dependent" encompasses children (including foster and adopted),
grandchildren, stepchildren, siblings, parents, grandparents, stepparents,
nephews, nieces, aunts, uncles, in-laws, or any individual living with the
taxpayer for whom the taxpayer provides more than half of the support.39
Exemptions are available for any dependent who is a child of the tax-
payer and is either younger than nineteen years of age or younger than
twenty-four years of age and a full-time student, unless the child is mar-
ried and filed with his or her spouse and for any dependent whose gross
income is less than the personal exemption amount.' The definition of
dependent requires provision of more than half of the individual's sup-
port in the tax year.42 Support includes food, lodging, clothing, health
care, and education. Custodial parents are generally entitled to claim an
exemption for the child unless they waive their claim to the exemption in
writing. 3 This rule leads to significant problems in the case of divorced
parents, when the child may be living in one parent's household yet re-
ceiving substantial financial support from the noncustodial parent. At-
mony payments are deductible from gross income; this deduction is not
found under the dependency provisions."
The introduction of the "kiddie tax" was an important element of
the 1986 tax reform. The kiddie tax provision requires that all unearned
income over a certain threshold, currently $650 per year, of children
younger than fourteen years of age be taxed at the parents' highest mar-
ginal rate.45 The motivation behind this requirement was the perception
that income shifting and reattribution within the family unit to young
children with little or no earned income was a significant problem that
37. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3).
38. I.R.C. § 152.
39. I.R.C. § 152(a).
40. I.R.C. §8 151(c) (1) (B), § 151(c)(2).
41. I.R.C. § 151(c) (1) (A).
42. I.R.C. § 152(a).
43. I.R.C. § 152(e).
44. I.R.C. § 215.
45. I.R.C. § 1(g).
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reduced tax revenues. The kiddie tax makes a particularly strained at-
tempt to maintain the illusion of individual taxation. The child is still
taxed as an individual, which means that his or her income is not aggre-
gated with the parents' income, yet the child's tax rate is set by reference
to the parents' income.
Income shifting has proved a pernicious problem throughout the
history of the income tax code because of the emphasis on individual
filing. Married couples are generally treated as a taxable unit, eliminating
the value of shifting between the spouses, but incentives remain for cou-
ples to reduce tax liability by shifting income to children or other reh-
tives from whom they can recoup the shifted income post-taxation. Al-
though earned income cannot be shifted, income-producing property can
be transferred relatively easily through gifts, effectively shifting income for
tax purposes without surrendering the income from an economic per-
spective. Creative efforts by taxpayers have necessitated torturous addi-
tions to the tax code in attempts to eliminate tax savings from income
shifting. In addition to the kiddie tax, several other provisions of the code
address the problems of income shifting. Under the umbrella of corporate
taxation, the attribution rules for share ownership applied to certain
transactions of shares reflect concerns that shareholders selling stock will
give up title yet retain significant economics interests through family
members, as well as through institutional connections. Below-market
loans, another concern, are also given special treatment in the tax code.
In addition, losses on certain transactions between related taxpayers are
not allowable.'7 Income shifting through trusts in which the donor retains
significant control or other interest, although others are the beneficiaries,
has also necessitated several complex provisions in the code.
The Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC") is another wrinkle in the
scheme of federal individual income taxation. Enacted in 1975, the EITC
is a refundable tax credit system designed to provide supplementary in-
come, relief from extraordinarily burdensome taxes, and work incentives
for the lowest-income taxpayers.4 9 Taxpayers actually receive money
back from the federal government if their EITC exceeds their tax liabil-
ity. The EITC represents an unusually explicit integration of the govem-
ment's revenue collection and wealth transfer functions. The EITC is
46. I.R.C. § 7872.
47. I.R.C. § 267. See also McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 695 (1947) (holding that
'wash sales' include certain market transactions not directly between related persons).
48. I.R.C. §§ 671-677.
49. Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, supra note 11, at
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adjusted for family size, with the credit as a percentage of earned income
increasing with the number of dependents in a family. The EITC is also
available to a broader range of households than nuclear family units.
Married taxpayers may only claim EITC if they file jointly. Because of the
structure of the EITC, low-income taxpayers may incur substantial EITC
marriage penalties if they marry. The EITC is available to all low-income
workers but is most valuable to low-income earners with a qualifying
child. A second child increases the amount of the maximum credit, but
third and additional children produce no additional benefit. The EITC
benefits are explicitly phased out as the taxpayer's income rises?°
The tax code also provides family-related tax benefits through sev-
eral other provisions, such as limited tax credits for expenses for house-
hold and child care services necessary for employment5 The child care
credit, however, is woefully inadequate compared with the actual costs of
providing daycare services for children. Additional credits are provided
for the elderly and the permanently and totally disabled A supplemen-
tary deduction is also allowed for aged or blind taxpayers.53
Family responsibilities are taken into account in many different ways
in the current U.S. tax code. The tax code mixes individual and family
taxation while maintaining the rhetoric of individual taxation. This
method of family taxation shows no overall scheme and results in
anomalous outcomes. For most taxpayers, the tax code is a mysterious
and incomprehensible document.
III. SIGNIFICANT ISSUES IN U.S. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
THE FAMILY AND MAJOR PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. Important Concerns in Federal Income Taxation of the Family
Fairness, efficiency, and administrabiity are the touchstones for de-
signing workable tax legislation. The raison d'tre of tax law is to raise
revenue, but other motivations for a tax scheme include promotion of
economic stability and growth, redistribution of wealth, correction of
market failures, and support of non-revenue-related policy. Scholars ex-
amining the tax code have identified several problems with the method
50. I.R.C. § 13.
51. I.R.C. § 21. Tax savings vary from 30% to 20% of expenses incurred as taxpayer's in-
come rises above $10000. The maximum credit is $2400 for the first qualifiying dependent and
$4800 if there is more than one qualifying dependent.
52. I.R.C. § 22.
53. I.R.C. § 63(0.
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of taxing the family on the basis of normative models of taxation and
incentive effects of economic regulation. Consensus about which prcb-
lems are most significant and should take precedence in tax reform has
been difficult to attain. Proposals for tax reform have largely focused on
narrow problems rather than on the basic method of family taxation it-
self. The most common issues in family taxation, which are discussed in
this section, are recognition of family arrangements, marriage as a deter-
minant of tax liability, the marriage bonus/penalty, secondary earner bias,
taxation of imputed income, the EITC, treatment of dependents, attn-
bution and income shifting, theoretical justifications, and administrabil-
ity. These issues are revisited in the context of the French personal in-
come tax scheme in Part V.
A principal weakness of the current tax code is the lack of theoreti-
cal justification for the system of family taxation. The lack of cohesion
makes the tax code difficult for taxpayers to understand, let alone trust or
respect. The lack of theoretical justification for the tax code results in
piecemeal changes that are inconsistent, complex, and greeted with cyni-
cism by taxpayers. There are several methods of providing dependent tax
benefits in the current tax code. Furthermore, the individual is treated as
the basic taxable unit, yet the joint return and the kiddie tax undermine
that notion. We have neither a complete system of individual taxation
nor a complete system of family taxation; rather we have an intermediate
hybrid created by historical accident without logical justification. The
lack of rationale also makes modification of the tax code difficult because
legislators do not have a fixed framework to guide or circumscribe legis-
lative choices; ad hoc decision-making is entrenched as a norm of tax
legislation.
As discussed, the combination of individual taxation and progressiv-
ity creates enormous pressures on identification of the proper taxpayer for
particular items of income and tremendous temptations to shift income
to lower-income taxpayers or taxable units to avoid triggering higher tax
brackets. Congress and the Internal Revenue Service have struggled to
eliminate, or at least discourage, income shifting. Income shifting under-
mines revenue collection and progressivity. It also delegitimizes the tax
law in the eyes of many taxpayers who feel that other taxpayers are tak-
ing advantage of tax breaks unavailable to those without the help of so-
phisticated tax and accounting services.5 4 These additional provisions
also erode even the meager theoretical underpinnings of the current tax
code, such as the professed commitment to individual taxation. Equally
54. David Johnston, High Earners Paying No U.S. Income Tax Rose to Nearly 2,400 in 1993,
N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 1997, at A21.
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troublesome is the additional complexity introduced into the tax code by
attempts to curb income-shifting practices. Provisions related to income
shifting are among the most cumbersome and difficult to administer ke-
cause they are targeted at diverse practices involving manipulation of
subtle notions of control and benefit of income between taxpayers with
complex relationships. Structural elimination of opportunities for income
shifting would allow significant simplification of the tax code and reduce
loopholes available to creative taxpayers.
As discussed, three principles of taxation to which we aspire-mar-
riage neutrality, couples neutrality, and progressivity-cannot be satisfied
simultaneously. The compromise response embodied in the tax code re-
sults in the creation of marriage penalties and bonuses. The current tax
code achieves couples neutrality between married couples yet sacrifices
marriage neutrality to do so. Although the marriage penalty became less
significant after the tax reform of 1986, when rates were flattened and
progressivity reduced, it has become increasingly important as marginal
tax rates have again risen. Although marriage penalties are most obvious
in the rate tables, they are compounded by other provisions phasing out
or reducing certain tax breaks for married couples faster than for two
single individuals. For example, the standard deduction and limits on
exclusion of Social Security benefits operate in such a fashion.55
Marriage penalties and bonuses also raise fundamental questions of
fairness. The marriage penalty is particularly offensive because marriage
continues to be a respected social institution. The marriage bonus is usu-
ally considered innocuous but is becoming increasingly controversial as
awareness grows that certain couples, namely homosexual couples, are
denied the right to marry and, thus, denied the opportunity to avail
themselves of these tax benefits. Furthermore, efficiency is a primary
concern of the tax code-tax law should distort decisions as little as pos-
sible, especially decisions as personally and economically significant as
marriage. The extent to which marriage penalties and bonuses affect
marriage is unknown. Given the social significance and nontax conse-
quences of marriage, the extent to which penalties and bonuses affect
decisions about marriage may well be small. The role of penalties and
bonuses will grow as their size increases and as marriage becomes less
well-defined as a social institution. Regardless of actual consequences,
marriage penalties and bonuses are an important issue from a normative
perspective.
The "secondary earner bias" is the term for the high marginal tax




rates experienced by the secondary or discretionary earner in the joint-
return household, who is usually the wife. The secondary earner bias is
another effect of progressivity in taxation and has received much atte-
tion from commentators in recent years.56 The income of the secondary
earner in the household, starting from the very first dollar, will be taxed
at the marginal rate set by the income level of the primary earner. This
system can result in taxation at a rate as high as 39.6%, not including
social security and other payroll taxes, which is prohibitively high for
certain taxpayers. When the additional costs of a secondary earner join-
ing the marketplace, such as transportation, child care, and other hone-
making services, are taken into account, many secondary earners may
find it impossible to engage in market work.
The secondary earner bias is at least partially a question of percep-
tion-allocating the entire income of the secondary earner to the highest
tax bracket rather than properly dividing exemptions, deductions, and
lower tax brackets heightens the punitive aspect of the tax. The tax code
could allocate tax burdens to each spouse separately if we were commit-
ted to treating spouses as economic individuals rather than as an eco-
nomic unit. Several alternative formulae for calculating the joint tax bur-
den allocation to each spouse have been proposed.57 However, the reality
is that, in the vast majority of cases, the spouses act as a unit for most
purposes. Hence, the household does experience the secondary earner's
income as being taxed at a high marginal tax rate; the family must decide
as a unit whether the secondary earner's presence in the marketplace is
worth the costs.
Elimination of the secondary earner bias through tax solutions may
not be as imperative as many scholars assume. The secondary earner bias
varies with socioeconomic status.58 For many women in lower-income or
middle-income families, market work may be a necessity rather than a
dispensable luxury. For them, the secondary earner bias is inconsequai-
tial because there is nothing secondary about their work. The fact that
women's labor force participation continues to increase despite the sec-
ondary earner bias, which would predict otherwise, supports this conjec-
ture. Furthermore, these arguments may place too much emphasis on
market work. Unpaid workers, i.e., homemakers, may derive satisfaction
56. See McCaffery, supra note 9; Nancy Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L. J. 1571
(1996); Anne Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 2001 (1996); Marjorie Kornhauser, Love, Money and the IRS: Family, Income
Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L. J 63 (1993).
57. Richard B. Malmud, Allocation of the Joint Return Marriage Penalty and Bonus, 15 VA. TAX
REv. 489 (1996).
58. Staudt, supra note 56, at 1611-14.
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from their labor in the home. 9 They may see no advantages in market
work, particularly if they were to trade their positions in the home for
low-paying, low-glamour, low-esteem positions in the marketplace.60
Tax solutions to the secondary earner bias may also prove unsuc-
cessful or incomplete. The secondary earner bias is most visible in the
effective marginal tax rates of the joint return, but it is the product of
even more serious phenomena, namely, the failure to tax imputed in-
come and marketplace constraints on discretionary employment. Seccn-
dary earners are likely to pursue temporary or part-time work, often after
a hiatus from the workplace. Employers may place a premium on depth,
breadth, and continuity of work experience and long-term commitment
to career, devaluing the secondary earner for whom work is only one of
several competing concerns. Furthermore, benefits may be available on a
reduced basis or not at all for secondary earners. Secondary earners may
find it difficult to advance in their careers and may feel trapped in the
role of secondary earners, eventually abandoning the marketplace to re-
turn to working in the home, for reasons completely unrelated to taxa-
tion.The failure to tax imputed income may also be an overwhelming
factor discouraging secondary earners from entering the marketplace.!'
Imputed income is nonmonetary income that a person provides to herself
through labor or capital. For example, home childcare, which is not paid
for if provided by a parent (usually the mother) but must be paid for if
sought through the marketplace, is an important form of tax-free im-
puted income available to the family. Women who move from home-
making to market work will lose the tax advantages of non-market, im-
puted income and will frequently have to pay in after-tax dollars to re-
place the services that they formerly provided to their families. In recent
legal scholarship, including the tax literature, commentators have un-
dertaken a heightened scrutiny of housework. This literature expresses
the concern that the law conceptualizes housework as an expression of
affection and undervalues it as a result. Treatment of housework in the
tax law can set norms that cut across a number of legal disciplines.62 De-
nying the value of housework disadvantages and harms those who per-
form it. Although there is an understandable reluctance to tax household
59. Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U.L. REV.
1,47 (1996).
60. Staudt, supra note 56.
61. See McCaffery, supra note 9, at 1001. Estimates of the economic value of housework
range from 224% to 60% of the GDP. Silbaugh, supra note 59, at 17-21.
62. Silbaugh, supra note 59, at 8.
1999 225
Duquesne Law Review
income when there is no actual income, there is growing awareness that
some sort of acknowledgment of housework by the tax system is neces-
sary.63 Taxation of imputed income may be the single most important
step in eliminating the secondary earner bias. Challenges in taxing im-
puted income include problems in defining work compared with leisure,
measuring and valuing housework, causing economic hardship by taxing
transactions that generate neither cash nor property, commodifying
women, and excluding other important values. Taxation of imputed in-
come is also extremely controversial and, for purposes of this article, is
assumed not to be a viable alternative.
The tax code varies greatly in how it takes family responsibilities into
account and how it values and compensates taxpayers for such burdens.
As one commentator eloquently summarized, "All children are not equal
under the federal income tax." Additional dependents may be worth
more than $2000 or as little as $0, depending on the household arrange-
ments, number of children, and income of the parents of the child. Un-
der the current income tax, children trigger four possible tax benefits: the
dependency exemption; the head of household status; the EITQ and the
child care credit. Thus, the tax code accommodates family responsibili-
ties in what can only be called strange and mysterious ways rather than
according to any consistent or meaningful plan. The current state of af-
fairs reflects the result of a process of accretion rather than a thoughtful,
unified approach to family taxation. The benefits available to families
should be rationalized according to a comprehensive scheme.
The impact of the EITC in the family context is particularly notable
with respect to the effects of marriage on the available credit: the EITC is
structured such that marginal tax rates on couples who individually qual-
ify for the EITC but who wish to marry are prohibitively high. Indeed,
this has been the most harshly criticized aspect of the controversial EITC
program. The EITC should be restructured to eliminate harsh marriage
penalties.65 The EITC itself reflects the difficulty in setting income tax
liabilities in a consistent manner such that low-income taxpayers are able
to be self-supporting. In part because the tax code does not provide a
subsistence-level exemption, supplementary measures must be provided
for the poorest taxpayers, who are unable to make up the difference
through their after-tax income.
63. Id.
64. Zelenak, supra note 28.
65. Forman, supra note 55.
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B. A Survey of Proposals for Reform of Family Taxation
Many of these issues in family taxation are widely known and well
understood; nevertheless, prioritizing and resolving these problems has
proven difficult. Different perspectives mandate different corrective
measures, and solutions remain elusive and controversial. Prescriptions
for reform tend to address individually narrowly identified problems with
the tax code.
Feminist tax scholars, relatively recent yet prolific participants in tax
policy debate, are particularly concerned about issues affecting female
autonomy, financial dependence, and status, such as the devaluation of
housework through the tax code, the gendered division of family labor,
and poverty among single mothers.' Feminist scholars are universally
concerned about the welfare of women yet identify different goals and
methods of pursuing those ends; those goals are often controversial and
may even conflict. Feminist tax scholars universally believe that the tax
code promotes women's economic insecurity and encourages economic
reliance on men. Some believe that housework is demoralizing and iso-
lating and the primary source of women's economic and independence
issues. Others believe that housework is not inherently demoralizing or
harmful for women but is so only to the extent that we characterize it as
such; housework and caregiving can also be empowering and positive and
are choices that should be respected. Scholars are divided among advo-
cating equal treatment for men and women, affirmative encouragement
of market work by women, and support for women in the roles they
choose for themselves.
Major proposals for tax reform motivated by feminist concerns in-
clude individual returns, special rate schedules for secondary earners,
family allowances, dependent care credits, and reforms in social security
payroll tax and benefits rules. Some scholars are more optimistic than are
others about the ability of the tax law to bring about social change.67 For
example, although many feminist scholars support individual filing to
mitigate the secondary earner bias and encourage women to work, indi-
vidual filing is not strictly neutral. Under an individual filing scheme,
imputed income would still not be taxed and homemakers would still
face that obstacle in deciding to enter the marketplace; at the same time,
family tax burdens for traditional families would rise. Furthermore, how
66. For a comprehensive review of these goals, see Alstott, supra note 56.
67. Compare Alstott, supra note 56, at 2004 (expressing disenchantment with projections of
the tax code's influence), with Silbaugh, supra note 56 (endorsing enthusiastically the tax code
as an instrument of social policy).
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tax rate cuts will change women's labor supply is indeterminate.68 The
benefits of individual filing are questionable because they are limited by
market demands and constraints and may vary by class and race as well.
Women's housework has not been found to decrease significantly with
market work; instead women may sacrifice their leisure to accommodate
their increased work burdens. Joint filing can be supported by the feni-
nist agenda if that agenda includes support for caregivers. 9
We are faced with a perhaps insoluble tangle of issues in improving
women's economic conditions. Tax law standing alone is unlikely to be
able to solve many of the problems that have been attributed, at least
partially, to the structure of the income tax. Recognizing those limita-
tions allows us to move forward rather than remain paralyzed by the in-
completeness and inadequacy of any proposed tax solution.
In addition to those with a feminist perspective, analysts of the tax
system include commentators concerned with efficiency, fairness, legiti-
macy, and other important issues. Individual filing has been supported by
many who are particularly focused on the principle of marriage neutrality
and those who are especially disturbed by marriage penalties!' Such
commentators acknowledge that marriage neutrality and couples neu-
trality cannot be achieved simultaneously in a progressive system but
argue that marriage neutrality is preferable to couples neutrality. They
identify the elimination of marriage penalties and bonuses as a para-
mount goal. Marital status is, after all, a fairly arbitrary criterion for clas-
sification and imposition of taxation.7' Some commentators believe that
the distinction between marrieds and singles is completely tenuous and
without foundation because no assumptions can be made solely on the
basis of marital status." Because there are no generally accepted equity
criteria, they advocate that we should eliminate all assumptions from the
code and have individual filing only, by overriding either Earl or Poe."
Furthermore, concern about the secondary earner bias and distor-
tions discouraging women in particular from entering the marketplace
drives support for separate taxation of all individuals as well. Separate
taxation of individuals would eliminate the high marginal tax rates expe-
68. Id. at 2017-2023.
69. Alstott, supra note 56, at 2005-2006.
70. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 55; Pamela Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 49 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1980); Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A
Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L.REv. 49 (1971).
71. JUNE O'NEILL, FAMILY ISSUES IN TAXATION, TAXING THE FAMILY 1 (Rudolph G. Penner
ed., 1983).
72. Pamela Gann, supra note 70.
73. Id.
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rienced by secondary earners through the tax tables. However, separate
taxation would not address the failure to tax imputed income or market-
place limitations on secondary earners. Many market-oriented prescrip-
tions, including the elimination of the joint return to remove the seccn-
dary earner bias, effect only women in the margins for whom elasticities
are high enough that their behavior is influenced by the tax code.
Other commentators advocate a flat tax or at least a reduction in
the progressivity of the current system. Some believe that a flat tax is
inherently fairer than is a progressive tax. A natural consequence of a
reduction in progressivity of income tax rates would be a reduction in the
marriage penalty. Even a flat tax is likely to incorporate some progressiv-
ity if it includes an exempt or deductible amount or a zero tax bracket.
Although the theoretical foundation of progressive taxation-the con-
cept of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth--is hotly contested,
progressivity is an integral feature of our tax system unlikely to be elimi-
nated; therefore, this article assumes progressivity as a desired goal.
Some scholars advocate joint filing with marriage bonuses by a re-
turn to a system in which married couples bear tax according to a rate
structure with brackets twice as wide and in which the standard deduc-
tion and all other exemptions are twice as large as for married couples as
they are for singles.74 The marriage bonus is generally less objectionable
than is the marriage penalty in that marriage continues to be perceived as
a valuable social institution. However, as the history of the tax reveals,
single taxpayers may object vehemently to a return of heavily dispropcr-
tionate taxation. Furthermore, some taxpayers are denied the opportu-
nity to marry, making this form of tax benefit inherently unfair and arbi-
trary.
A tax credit for two-earner couples was tried briefly in the early
1980s75 and continues to have support among some scholars! 6 Such a
credit would reduce the harsh marginal rates experienced by secondary
earners and reduce the marriage penalty for, couples likely to suffer it
(couples with two earners). The two-earner tax credit was eliminated
after tax reform in the 1980s resulted in reduced progressivity, marriage
penalties, and secondary earner bias; however, with increased tax rates,
this proposal once again gains some appeal. This proposal is purely furc-
tional, aimed at remedying a very narrow problem, and will not solve
74. Forman, supra note 55.
75. IRC § 221 (1984) enacted as Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34
103(a), 95 STAT. 172, 187, repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-514, 131, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100
STAT.) at 2113.
76. See Forman, supra note 55; McCaffery, supra note 9.
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problems such as income shifting and dependency disparities.
Increased child and dependent care credits, increased exemptions,
or some combination thereof would be a step toward acknowledging the
actual expenses of raising children and would help to relieve burdens on
secondary earners, particularly the taxpayers for whom those burdens are
heaviest." One option would be to provide family allowances in the form
of fixed payments per child to eligible families to supplement market
earnings and child support,"8 as is common throughout Western
Europe.79 Such proposals reflect a growing acceptance of the relationship
between tax and transfer programs and interest in unification of the two
systems. In his 1996 budget proposal, President Clinton has touted $500
per child tax credits as a measure to ease the tax burden for families with
children. Family allowances are popular proposals among poverty and
child welfare scholars."0 Such proposals inevitably raise distributional
questions, both with respect to how tax burdens will be shifted to subsi-
dize such a program and with respect to effects within the family.
Expansion of dependent care tax credits is another proposal directly
linked to providing support to taxpayers with dependents. The current
dependent care tax credit is inadequate, limited to taxpayers who file
returns, and worth the most to taxpayers in the highest brackets who
need it least. Dependent care credits are supported by those concerned
about the failure of tax imputed income and about women's market
work.8" Taxation of imputed income is also considered a feasible alterm-
tive in some cases, but the weight of public and scholarly opinion is
heavily against it. 2 An increased, dependent exemption would more
closely approximate the financial demands of supporting a child8 3
Taxation by household, under the current rate tables for joint mar-
ried filers, or at least broader consideration of real economic units has
also garnered some support among academics.8 4 As discussed infra, taxa-
tioh by household may be a more economically realistic and easily ad-
ministrable approach to personal income taxation. Taxation by house-
hold would eliminate certain arbitrary classifications, particularly marital
77. Forman, supra note 55; Zelenak, supra note 28, at 355-57.
78. Alstott, supra note 56, at 2042-45.
79. Such programs are outlined in Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, Social Policy and
Children in the United States and Europe, in THE VULNERABLE 351, 363-65 (John L. Palmer et al.
eds., 1988).
80. Alstott, supra note 56, at 2044; see infra notes 178-180.
81. Id. at 2058-59.
82. Silbaugh, supra note 56, at 55-56.
83. Zelenak, supra note 28, at 417.
84. Frederick R. Schneider, supra note 19; McCaffery, supra note 9, at 1055.
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status, from the tax code and would establish a fairer, more efficient in-
come tax.
Other proposals have also focused on the Social Security system,
which is a payroll tax that is independent from yet linked to the personal
income tax. 5 Comprehensive reconsideration of the personal income
tax, which appears to be the most productive method of tax reform, has
been rare. Although major tax reform may be a daunting prospect,
piecemeal approaches to tax legislation designed to address certain prcb-
lems are likely to run afoul of other important concerns, as well as to
contribute to confusion and administrative complexity. Consideration of
the French system of income taxation provides a fresh look at how family
taxation might be approached differently.
IV. FAMILY TAXATION IN THE FRENCH PERSONAL INCOME
TAX SYSTEM
The personal income tax system of France relies on a different para-
digm of economic units and ability to pay than does the U.S. model, me-
suiting in a very different method of determining tax burdens. In contrast
to the U.S. model, the French personal income tax is constructed as a
family income tax rather than as an individual income tax. L'impot sur le
revenu6 is imposed on individuals singly or families jointly on their total
annual revenue. The personal income tax is levied under a single rate
table applicable to all taxable units; the tax is imposed by applying the
rate table to each share of the family income, the family quotient, corre-
lated to the number of members of the household. The tax varies as a
function of family situations and its basic concept is to tax equally each
adult equivalent in the household.
In recent years, new taxes called the generalized social contribution7
and the social debt reimbursement contribution,8 8 which neither are pro-
gressive nor take into account the size of the family, have been intro-
duced to finance the social security system. These additional taxes are
smaller than and separate from the traditional income tax that is the fD-
cus of this article and, hence, are not discussed. All of these taxes to-
gether form the complex web of French taxes, including the value-added
85. Alstott, supra note 56, at 2059-63.
86. The French income tax, L'impot sur le revenu, is codified in the Code General des Impots
[C.G.I.]. All citations are to the 1995 C.G.I. unless otherwise specified.
87. Currently 3.4% on a broad income base.
88. Currently 0.5% on a broad income base.
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tax ("VAT"), of which the personal income tax is only a small part.
French personal income taxes are less than eight percent of the gross
domestic product and a small proportion overall of tax revenues! 9 Issues
in determining gross income through a combination of inclusions, exclu-
sions, and deductions' on various categories of income, expenses, and
losses are similar to issues that arise with respect to the U.S. tax code and
are beyond the scope of this article.
The original French income tax was introduced in 1914 and was
imposed on the household, with the male head of household being liable
for the tax.' The taxation system clearly contemplated the family as a
cohesive social group. The essentials of the current tax system were in-
troduced after World War II and are based on the predominant tradi-
tional model of the married nuclear family in which the father engages in
market work and the mother engages in housework and caregiving. The
tax is imposed on all French residents91 except those wage earners mak-
ing less than the minimum annual wage or taxpayers whose total house-
hold income net of expenses is below a certain threshold.92
The taxable unit is the fiscal household, or the foyer fiscal, which is
composed of husband, wife, dependent children, and any qualified dis-
abled person, regardless of family relationship, who lives with the family.
Thus, the tax is levied on the aggregated income of those members of the
household who qualify as part of the same taxable unit 3 The income of
the fiscal household is the sum of net incomes and losses 4 of the mem-
bers of the tax household.95 The French personal incomne tax is imposed
on net income that falls into one of eight enumerated and extensively
defined categories.97 Although the tax code generally contemplates that
89. HUGH AULT, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION 42 (1997).
90. Louise Dulude, Taxation of the Spouses: A Comparison of Canadian, American, British,
French and Swedish Law, 23 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 67, 71 (1985).
91. C.G.I. art. 4. Nonresidents must pay French income tax on income earned in France and
in accordance with international tax treaties. Id.
92. C.G.I. art. 5.2. In 1993, the minimum wage was fixed at FF 35,400 annually. The
threshold for household income was FF 42,500, and slightly higher for elderly taxpayers. These
amounts are indexed for inflation. Id.
93. C.G.I. art. 6.1.
94. This aggregation of gains and losses can be a major advantage if one person in the family
experiences a net loss; that loss can be used to offset another family members income and reduce
the fiscal household's income overall. On the other hand, if that person were filing as an indi-
vidual, he or she would receive no tax benefit from the loss.
95. C.G.I. art. 156.
96. C.G.I. arts. 1, 156.
97. The eight categories are: 1)real estate income ; 2)industrial and commercial profits ; 3)
remunerations received by certain company managers; 4) agricultural profits; 5) salary and pen-
sion income; 6) personal services income and other related incomes; 7) private capital gains; and
Vol. 37:207
French Family Taxation as a Model for Reform
the tax will be imposed on income that is likely to be periodic from a
steady source,98 this assumption has been reversed by statute to some
extent. All employees receive a standard deduction of twenty-eight per-
cent of their earned income (limited by the ceilings on the deductions),
so the tax is imposed on only seventy-two percent of earned income.99
The number of shares in a family, referred to as the family coeffi-
cient, is used to apportion the shares of income, the quotient familial or
family quotient, to which the rate table is subsequently applied. The fam-
ily coefficient is determined by the number of people in the foyer fiscal
and their relationships and specifies the number of shares into which the
household income is divided. The family coefficient is carefully elan-
rated by statute and reflects policy choices and attempts to achieve tax
equity by making a realistic estimate of ability to pay." Single taxpayers,
whether never married, divorced, or widowed, receive one share. Married
but legally separated taxpayers are also treated as single taxpayers. Un-
married taxpayers cohabiting are always treated as separate taxpayers.10 1
Married taxpayers as a unit receive two shares and must file jointly unless
they are legally separated.102 To the extent that they both earn roughly
equivalent incomes, married taxpayers are treated as basically equal to
individual taxpayers, but they experience the additional advantages of
being able to average income if one spouse earns a disproportionate
amount of the total income and of being able to offset losses of one
against the income of the other. This result is similar to the system that
was in place in the United States between 1948 and 1961 before rates for
individual filers were reduced.
The assignment of shares for dependents is somewhat more compli-
cated and reflects compromises among economic accuracy, administm-
bility, and policy preferences. A married couple or widow(er) receives
one half-share for each of their first two children, and a full share for each
additional child.'0 3 Thus, a married couple or widow(er) with one child
receives two and one-half shares; a married couple or widow(er) with two
children receives three shares; a married couple or widow(er) with three
8) ecurities income. C.G.I. art. 1 . See also C.G.I. art. 12 (1995). For extensive definitions of
each category, see Article 14 et seq.
98. This principle is known as the "civil law source theory."
99. A standard deduction of 10% of net income is allowed for professional expenses. The
deduction was capped at FF 133400 in 1994.Furthermore, employees are entitled to a further
20% standard deduction. The deduction was capped at FF 73270 in 1994.
100. C.G.I. art. 194.
101. Note that for purposes of the wealth tax, cohabiting couples are treated as one fiscal
household. C.G.I. art. 885 E.
102. C.G.I. art. 6.4.
103. C.G.I. art. 194.
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children receives four shares; a married couple or widow(er) with four
children receives five shares; and so on. In contrast, a single person with
dependent children receives one share for the first child."° The single
parent's second child garners one half-share, and each child after the
second garners one full share. A widow(er) with dependent children not
parented by the deceased spouse is treated as a single person with the
same number of dependents for determining the family coefficient. The
disparity between the treatment of the first child of married taxpayers
and the first child of a single taxpayer creates a head of household type of
status in the French tax code. However, in France, a head of household
actually receives a more generous allowance than does a married couple,
whereas, in the United States, a head of household receives more gener-
ous treatment than does a single taxpayer but less generous treatment
than does a married couple.
The definition of "dependent" in France is less flexible than is the
definition used in the United States. In France, dependency status baa-
cally extends only to children of the head(s) of household."'5 Children
younger than eighteen years of age are automatically counted as depend-
ents of their parents; if their parents are separated, they are counted as
dependents of the parent with whom they live or who provides most of
their support, unless the parents agree otherwise. 6 Children automati-
cally treated as dependents include biological children or any child with-
out an independent income taken into the home, including adopted
children and foster children; any child treated as a dependent must be
younger than eighteen years of age, with the exception that anyone who
has a disability may be considered a dependent, subject to the extensions
noted below." 7 Dependent children may, however, file separate tax re-
turns by election of the parent(s)-an option that may be desirable for
children with high personal incomes °0
Children who have attained majority may continue to be treated as
dependents of their parents and part of their tax household with the
agreement of their parents under the following circumstances: (1) if they
are younger than twenty-one years of age; (2) if they are younger than
twenty-five years of age and pursuing a regular course of study; or, re-
gardless of age, (3) if they are performing military service or have a dis-
104. C.G.I. art. 194.
105. C.G.I. art. 196.
106. C.G.I. art. 196.
107. C.G.I. art. 196.
108. C.G.I. art. 6.3.
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ability. 9 However, adult children who choose to be considered part of
their original fiscal household under these exceptions receive only a half-
share, regardless of their birth order."' Married children are generally
treated as part of their own tax household with their spouses, regardless
of age. Married children who meet the criteria for dependency can
choose to have their joint income either aggregated between husband
and wife to form an independent foyer fiscal or aggregated with the par-
ents of either spouse.1 Married children or adult children with depend-
ents who choose to file with the parents of either spouse do not increase
the family coefficient of the filing household but entitle the filing tax-
payer to a fixed deduction (equivalent to the maximum deduction al-
lowed of one-half share per person), so becoming a dependent.112 A tax-
payer may not benefit from both a family share and a support deduction
for the same child in the same year." 3 Any disabled resident of the tax-
payer's household may be assimilated to the family for tax purposes in the
same manner as is a dependent child."4 In other words, a disabled per-
son living with a married couple with no children adds 0.5 to the family
coefficient; such a person living with a married couple with two children
adds 1 to the family coefficient, just as an additional child would.
The French tax code provides for deductions for adjustments to the
net income of the household for the following special circumstances that
are outside the purview of the eight regular income categories and di-
rectly relevant to family taxation: court-ordered alimony and child sup-
port payments; and any support provided to the taxpayer's children if
they are not counted as his or her dependents and are not part of his or
her foyer fiscal. These deductions are for the full amount of any such
payments made," 5 except in the case of adult children; support payments
to adult children who are not a part of the fiscal household are capped at
the same level as are the tax savings per half-share accorded to a depend-
ent child." 6 Therefore, tax savings for adult children receiving support
cannot exceed savings for the first and second qualifying dependent chil-
dren of a married taxpayer. For married adult children, this ceiling is
109. C.G.I. art. 6.3. Compare C.G.I. art. 156.11.2 and 196B.
110. C.G.I. art. 196 B.
111. C.G.I. art. 6.3.2.
112. C.G.I. art. 196 B. In 1993, this amount was set at FF 27120.
113. C.G.I. art. 156.11.2.
114. C.G.I. art. 196A bis.
115. C.G.I. art. 156.11.2. In 1994, this amount was capped at FF 20780. Id. Furthermore, the
tax savings from maintenance to a child of legal age pursuing post-secondary education is at




doubled if the parent claiming the deduction can show that she or he
alone supports the child's household, i.e., the child and his or her spouse.
A taxpayer receiving alimony or child support payments after a legal
separation or a divorce, such that the former spouses are in separate tax
households, thereby leading to a deduction for the paying party, necess-
tates a corresponding inclusion in net income for the recipient.1 7 The
taxpayer may also deduct support paid voluntarily to a person older than
seventy-five years of age living in the home of the taxpayer and having a
limited personal income, even if such elderly person is unrelated to the
taxpayer."' Such a deduction is in the amount of the value of the living
quarters and food provided, as estimated for social security purposes." 9
The tax law also provides additional shares to the fiscal household in
special situations. Certain relatively low-income elderly or disabled tax-
payers receive an additional deduction from their total income before the
calculation of the tax."2 Single taxpayers, including those who are wid-
owed or divorced, with no dependents, may reduce their net income by
one-third before calculating the tax due if they meet certain hardship
conditions.' The family coefficient is augmented by one-half share for
any household with a dependent disabled child. 2 Finally, a married cou-
ple receives an additional one-half share if either spouse has a disability
and a full share if both spouses have disabilities. 2 '
After the family coefficient has been determined, the size of the
family shares is calculated by dividing the aggregated net income of the
fiscal household by the coefficient." This amount is the income attrib-
uted to each "adult-equivalent" taxpayer in the household for purposes of
calculating the tax. This amount, multiplied by each family member's
individual coefficient (either one or one half), is each family member's
"share" of the household income for tax purposes. This process has the
117. C.G.I. art. 158.5(c).
118. C.G.I. art 156.11.2.3.
119. Id. This measure is similar to the U.S. cost of living index. In 1993, therefore, the de-
duction for elderly dependents living in the home of the taxpayer was limited to a maximum of
FF 16,660. Id.
120. C.G.I. art. 157. For married couples filing together as a common fiscal household, these
numbers are doubled if each spouse satisfied the conditions of age or disability.
121. These conditions include having adult children forming their own fiscal household, hav-
ing lost a child of at least 16 years of age, receipt of certain pensions, disability, and veterans
over 65. C.G.I. art. 195.1. In all cases, to be recognized as handicapped for purposes of the tax
code, the individual must be in possession of a "carte d'invalidit," a state-certification of disabil-
ity.
122. C.G.I. arts. 195.2, 195.5.
123. C.G.I. arts 195.3, 195.4.
124. C.G.I. art. 193.
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effect of averaging income across family members based on the number of
adult equivalents in the family.
The application of the rate table to the family share determines the
family's tax burden for each share, which is multiplied by the family coef-
ficient to obtain the total family tax burden. Thus, the rate table corre-
sponds theoretically to the individual rate table in the U.S. tax code. The
rates and the brackets set by the French legislature are a function of
complex interactions among policy choices, revenue goals, demographics,
and income distributions. The current French personal income tax
structure contains seven brackets. In the past, the French personal in-
come tax has had as many as thirteen tax brackets."z The tax brackets
are indexed for inflation. The consequence of this method of imposing
the same tax on each share of the family income is to multiply the width
of each tax bracket by the number of shares attributed to the household.
In this way, the progressivity or the steepness of the tax schedule is dra-
matically reduced as family size increases. The individual income tax
burden is concentrated on the taxpayers having the highest income, and
almost half of all households and possible taxpayers are exempt. French
income taxes represent a relatively smaller portion of the tax revenues
than do income taxes in the United States.
Under the French system, the gross tax is computed by multiplying
the tax imposed on one share of the family income by the number of
shares originally used to determine the family quotient. The tax savings
for dependents per half share are limited to a ceiling. 26 This limitation
was prompted by concern that the quotient familial system created a
strong bias in favor of high income families and canceled out progressivity
at higher income levels. It was designed to limit the value of dependent
deductions for the highest-earning taxpayers, for whom the dependent
125. The tax rates, brackets, and conversion into U.S. dollars are as follows:
Tax rate Increment in taxable Size of taxable share
share in Francs in dollars
0.0% FF 22210 <$4500
12.0% FF 22210-48570 $4500-9900
25.0% FF 48570-85480 $9900-17400
35.0% FF 85480-138410 $17400-28200
45.0% FF 138410-225210 $28000.45850
50.0% FF 225210-277730 $45850-56550
56.8% FF 277730- $56550-
These are 1994 figures. C.G.I. art. 197 (1995).
126. Specifically, in 1994, the maximum tax savings per additional half-share is the family
coefficent beyond the shares of the filing taxpayers was limited to FF 15620. Furthermore, the
maximum deduction to a single taxpayer for his first dependent (worth a full share) was limited
to FF 19330. C.G.I. art. 197.2.
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deductions are worth the most. The final tax due is computed on the
gross tax determined from the family quotient system by applying several
deductions of personal expenses. 27 Finally, if the tax due is less than a
certain amount, then tax liability is waived.2 '
The French taxpayer does not calculate his or her own taxes; rather,
the taxpayer submits an annual report of income, expenses, losses, de-
pendents, and other relevant statistics of the fiscal household and the tax
authorities calculate the tax liability.'29 Although popular lore holds that
this practice results from the complexity of the French income tax, to
some extent this practice may merely be a product of tax tradition. The
statement to the tax authorities includes a list of the taxpayer's children
and dependents, and their dates and places of birth."'0 The members of
the household are determined on the first of January in the year in which
the tax is imposed; that is, after the close of the taxable year.' The tax is
paid in three installments over the course of the year.'3 2 Tax withholding
does not apply to earned income but does apply in limited other situa-
tions.
133
Conceptually, the income tax is designed around the idea that each
individual in the household imposes a certain burden on the total family
income. Each family member forms an individual consumption unit
within the family and receives a certain fraction of the family's income. A
portion of the family's income is assumed to be apportioned to each fam-
ily member both for actual consumption and as a reference for making
economic decisions that affect the entire family. Each family member's
consumption burden constrains the consumption opportunities and ded-
sions of the other members of the household. The policy holds that the
family as a whole should pay the same tax as would an equivalent num-
ber of adult individuals with the same income as the (roughly) average
income of the family members. The French tax code is often conceived of
as taxing equally people with the same potential standard of living, which
is a function of household income, family arrangement, and family size. 34
127. Ault, supra note 89, at 42. Also see Les Imp6ts en France 45 (1994). C.G.I. art. 193.
C.G.I. arts. 199 quater Bto-200. For example, such expenses include a fraction of child care
costs, education expenses for children, and home repairs. C.G.I. arts. 199 quater D, F, sexies C.
128. This amount was FF 4180. C.G.I. art. 197.4.
129. C.G.I. art. 170. The report is due on March 1 of each year. Id.
130. C.G.I. art. 174.
131. C.G.I. art. 196 bis.
132. Les Imp6ts en France, supra note 127, at 104, 107.
133. C.G.I. art. 182A. Withholding applies to certain forms of income of taxpayers domiciled
(as defined by the Code) outside of France. Id.
134. Girard Calot, Imp&t direct et famille, 14 REVUE FRANCAISE DE FINANCES PUBLIQUES [Rev.
Fr. Fin. Pub.] 39 (1986).
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The formula for calculating the tax must then take into account the
consumption burden imposed by each family member. Because of the
economies of scale, as well as the relatively smaller portions of household
income spent on children than on adults, all dependents received only a
one-half share when the system was originally designed. However, that
rule has since been adjusted so that dependents beyond the first two re-
ceive full shares. That is, as family size increases, the percentage increase
in family size decreases, and the percentage decrease in the family quo-
tient also decreases.'35 The tax savings from dependent shares are capped
to counteract the regressive effects of the deductions taken by higher-
income taxpayers against the progressive tax table.
Although each family member could be treated as one full con-
sumption unit, such a rule would be overly generous and economically
inaccurate. Theoretically, the number of shares should be determined by
determining the number of "single adult equivalents" in the household.136
If the rate table for single individuals reflects a reasonable compromise
between revenue needs and fairness and ability to pay, then, for a house-
hold, the amount of tax should be a function of how that household
compares with a single individual. To the extent that we are trying to
move to a more accurate system, that system should take into account
real patterns of family income sharing. Additional family members do
impose additional burdens; however, they also enable the advantages of
economies of scale. Furthermore, families typically spend less on children
than on adults. One study determined that the average expense per ad-
ditional child was thirty-eight percent of the expense of maintaining a
certain standard of living for an adult.'37 This figure was found to vary
with the age of the child: it is twenty-eight percent for children younger
than five; thirty-four percent for children younger than nine; and forty-
six percent for children between nine and fifteen. 3' These ratios fall as
135. For example, for a family of 6 with an income of 100,000, when the couple has their first
child, the percentage increase in their family size is 50%. The percentage increase in their family
shares is 25% (a half share for the child); the family quotient is 40,000. When they have their
second child, the percentage increase in their family size is 33%. The percentage increase in
their family share is 20%; the family quotient is 33,000. When they have their third child, the
percentage increase in their family size is 25%. The percentage increase in their family share if a
half share would be 16.6%; the actual increase is a full share resulting in a 33% increase; the
family quotient is 25,000. When they have their fourth child, the percentage increase in their
family size is 20%. The percentage increase in family size if both third and fourth children re-
ceived half-shares would be 14.3%. The actual percentage increase in family share is 25%; the
family quotient is 20,000.
136. Calot, supra note 134, at 39.




family income rises. Thus, one-half share per additional dependent seems
to be an economically justifiable estimate. Although any sufficiently
practicable system will necessarily be imperfect in tracking family income
expenditures per person, the French system illustrates a comfortable
compromise between accuracy and administrability.
The French parliament originally enacted the scheme of the Code
General des Impots in pursuit of two goals: first, to achieve economic jus-
tice by recognizing that a husband and father would have a lesser ability
to pay taxes than would an unburdened bachelor; second, to support and
promote the family and the national birthrate.139 The first of these goals
contemplates the traditional model of family and conventional gender
roles as the norm. Under this characterization of the family, the econo-
mies of scale of a husband and wife and even children sharing a home, a
car, utilities, food, and other expenses are deemed insignificant in ccm-
parison with the additional expense borne by the husband-taxpayer.
Thus, the married taxpayer under the joint household filing system is
granted a considerably diminished tax burden as compared with a single
person with the same income. Whatever its political motivations, this
method of taxation was extremely effective at adjusting tax burdens for
family arrangements.
The demographic and social changes that have taken place in the
United States have also taken place in France, with the concomitant
sharp drop in the number of single-income, two-parent households. This
social transformation has been discussed by many French tax scholars,
who lament the ensuing emergence of a "marriage penalty" in France.
The French marriage penalty is created, not by the rate structures, which
are marriage neutral or favorable when one spouse earns a disproporticn-
ate amount of the family income (advantages of wider lower brackets),
but by the limitation of several deductions on a per fiscal household basis
rather than on a per share or per family member basis. Thus, in situations
in which an unmarried couple may each deduct up to a given ceiling for
home repairs or child care, the married couple together may take only
one deduction. The heaviest marriage penalty comes from the extra one-
half share provided to a single parent for the first child-if two people
each with one child (or two children between them if they both are the
parents of both children) marry, they will receive only two and one-half
shares for computing the family quotient; whereas, if they remain unmar-
ried, they receive a total of four shares. They may live together, work
together, and have children together, but they will still be considered two
139. Evelyne Sullerot, Evolution sociologique de la famille et inadaptation du systeme fiscal, 14
REV. FR. FIN. PUB. 7 (1986).
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separate fiscal households as long as they have no marriage certificate.
The advantages of remaining unmarried are reduced if one or the other
earns most of the household's income, but substantial marriage penalties
exist for most dual head of household couples.
Although many factors contribute to the decline in marriage, the tax
consequences create perverse incentives and additional pressures on the
already vulnerable institution. With the diminishment of the social
meaning of marriage, taxes become an increasingly important factor.
However, marriage is valuable not only for its social meaning, which is
relative, perhaps arbitrary, and in flux, but also for the stability it poten-
tially creates, particularly for families with children. Although strict mar-
riage neutrality may be difficult to achieve, most people agree that mar-
riage penalties are a particularly pernicious tax problem, especially when
they are so severe. Certain families with married parents may pay as
much as thirty percent more than a family with the same income and
number of children but with unmarried parents."4 Many scholars have
called for the adaptation of the French tax law to the realities of modem
life, but with little success.
French commentators have also considered the tax consequences of
the emergence of women into the workplace. French women entering
the workplace may experience the same secondary earner bias as that
produced by the U.S. tax code. This bias may be amplified in the French
system by the steeply progressive system. However, the doubling of the
tax brackets for married women, as well as additional widening of the
brackets for dependents, should mitigate the severity of the secondary
earner bias.
One concern that is particularly prevalent in France and much less
significant in the United States is the continuing decline in the birthrate.
One scholar referred to the problem as a "shadow extending over France
little by little."'4 The French literature surveyed for this article consis-
tently expressed concern about the decline in marriage and in birthrate
and advocated strong legislative support of the family and, particularly, of
marriage. 143 This explicitly pro-marriage stance adds another dimension
to problems such as marriage penalties and secondary earner bias.
The provisions of the wealth tax, which imposes an equal tax on
unmarried couples living together openly as it does on married couples,
140. Id. at 13.
141. Id.; Michel Debr , Linegald des m'nages face a l'imp6t sur le revenu, 14 Rev. Fr. Fin. Pub.
15 (1986).
142. Id. at 17-18.
143. Id. at 20-21. Sullerot, supra note 139, at 14.
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illustrate that identical treatment of the married and unmarried couple
based on their actual living situations rather than on their official status is
possible.'" Thus it is feasible to pursue a plan of recognizing real eco-
nomic units that is marriage neutral by extending the application of those
family recognition provisions. Unmarried couples could be assimilated to
married couples for purposes of taxation if they met certain criteria es-
sential to forming a foyer fiscal.
The French system of personal income taxation based on the fiscal
household is a simple yet flexible approach to family taxation. The family
share system is a rational method for equalizing tax burdens for taxpayers
in different economic positions based on family size and arrangement.
Although the French system has controversial aspects, the essential cn-
cept is straightforward and easily transferable to the U.S. tax law.
V. EVALUATION OF THE FAMILY SHARE SYSTEM
Two fundamental decisions in designing a system of personal income
taxation are selecting a taxable unit and estimating the burdens of caring
for dependents. Attribution of income and the choice of a taxable unit
are inextricably linked because the consequences of various attribution
schemes will vary with the choice of a taxable unit. Most discussion of
the taxable unit in the United States has focused on selecting between
individual filing and joint filing. Individual taxation is of limited practi-
cality, and our wavering commitment to individual taxation has pro-
duced an illogical and incomprehensible tax system. The joint return is
only a partial realization of its primary rationale that joint consumption
occurs between married couples such that property rights become irrele-
vant. If we accept that sharing does occur, the French family share sys-
tem, with certain proposed extensions outlined below, most accurately
reflects families' actual economic situations. Whether families, particu-
larly husbands and wives, really share control over household resources
remains an open empirical question to some extent; nonetheless, certain
presumptions of sharing are a reasonable approach to family taxation.
A. WAy Families Matter to Income Taxation
Two arguments, one tax internal and one tax external, may be made
144. The term "concubinage notoire" translates roughly as "commonly known or acknowl-
edged cohabitation." C.G.I. art. 885 E.
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for taking into account family arrangements and financial burdens when
computing the income tax. 45 First, internal to the tax system, is the prin-
ciple of fairness that taxpayers should be taxed according to ability to pay,
which is inextricably linked to the taxpayer's financial obligations to de-
pendents. Second, external to the tax system, is the policy decision that
child-rearing is a socially valuable activity that should be subsidized; this
approach is akin to treating family tax benefits as tax expenditures.
Some commentators perceive family living arrangements--in par-
ticular, the decision to have children-as private consumption choices
that are outside the concern of the personal income tax system. Under
this argument, parents choose to have children because they derive per-
sonal satisfaction from having children, much the same as they derive
satisfaction from eating out or vacationing in Tahiti. Consequently, chl-
dren cannot be perceived as a constraint on income or ability to pay;
rather, they are a choice of the taxpayer regarding expenditure of after-
tax income.
The narrowest argument that supports incorporating family respcn-
sibilities into the tax code is that the ability to pay is a function of discre-
tionary income available to the taxpayer beyond a certain lifestyle-
supporting, or at least subsistence-supporting, level of income. Children
are not strictly consumption because they are a long-term, very expen-
sive, unpredictable financial obligation and investment. The parent-child
obligation entails a unique level of commitment and responsibility. The
law recognizes that a child is a unique obligation and enforces a non-
contractual, vaguely defined, support obligation with severe penalties and
proscriptions. Children as people, particularly as dependent people, are
different from commodities to parents; they represent an inalienable
moral obligation in addition to social and legal obligations. If one does
not put gas in one's car, the only significant consequence is inconven-
ience; if one does not feed one's child, consequences are likely to include
harm to the child, concern, fear, and shame. Children are a unique eco-
nomic burden because of this combination of factors. The confluence of
the parenting obligation and the unique nature of the economic enter-
prise makes raising a child intrinsically different from other consumption
choices.
Considered from the perspective of the child, it is even harder to
characterize children as a mere consumption alternative. We cannot ig-
nore the welfare and personhood of the child. Children have the moral
and legal right to expect a certain level of subsistence and care. Particu-
145. The tax internal/tax external approach has been succinctly explained by Zelenak, supra
note 28, at 357-59.
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larly because they cannot speak for themselves and are dependent, we
must safeguard their interests. To most people the difference between
children and cars is self-evident.
Furthermore, if we choose to treat the decision to have a child as no
different from any other consumption decision then we must accept the
consequences of people treating children as no more than consumption
choices in other aspects of life as well. Although discussion of "soft val-
ues" has become unpopular, the consequences are too significant to ig-
nore. The tax code may not define our social mores and is only one piece
of our legal structure, but the tax code does shape our choices and reflect
and inform our values. A children-as-consumption approach commodi-
fies children and sacrifices some of our most deeply cherished values.
Children must be taken into account in determining tax burdens if we
accept their personhood and their right to a certain minimal standard of
living.
The same arguments that support the consideration of children in
designing a system of taxation extend to other family relationships as
well. Family living arrangements affect taxpayers' economic well-being.
These arrangements are central to determining taxpayers' ability to pay.
Although not all relationships entail enforceable obligations, economic
rationality, social and moral obligations, and a shared sense that people
should not be treated as commodities dictate that we respect these fun-
damental personal and economic decisions.
A tax-external argument for accounting for family arrangements is
much more politically sensitive and controversial. Subsidization of family
living arrangements is unlikely to receive popular support in the United
States, despite pro-family rhetoric. Taxpayers are much more likely to
agree that tax burdens overall are too high and that the system should be
redesigned than to respond to an argument that certain constituencies,
namely, larger families, should be preferred.
B. Does a Presumption of Sharing Make Sense?: Theoretical
Considerations
The concept of discretionary income that is available to the taxpayer
once his or her basic, subsistence-level needs have been provided for di-
rectly supports a fixed dependency exemption or credit.1" Ability to pay
is limited by the resources needed to support subsistence for the taxpayer
and her family; at incomes below a certain minimal, subsistence-
146. Id. at 361.
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supporting level, the taxpayer's ability to pay income tax will be zero-
every dollar must and will go toward essentials. Income beyond the mini.
mum requirements is discretionary income, over which the taxpayer ac-
tually exerts control and with respect to which the taxpayer may make
choices. Basic subsistence level will vary according to family size, family
arrangement, and ages of family members. However, subsistence expen-
ditures do not capture all family outlays: a family may spend considerably
more than subsistence level and maintain a substantially higher lifestyle;
in addition, a family may spend significantly more on each child than
mere subsistence would require. Thus, this discretionary approach is un-
likely to track the actual expenditures of the family with greater than
subsistence-level income, even if only necessities such as food, shelter,
and clothing are taken into account.
Under a strict discretionary income approach to taxation, taxpayers
should pay the same amount of taxes on all discretionary income regax-
less of the number of family members sharing in that income.47 The
proper method of taxation would be to apply the same tax rate structure
to every taxable unit's discretionary income after subtracting the subsis-
tence requirement. A couple with no children and a certain income be-
yond subsistence would pay exactly the same tax as would a family of six
with the same discretionary income and four children, including one at-
tending college and two requiring orthodontic treatment. Thus, no ad-
justment would be made for the spending patterns of various types of
families or households. Lifestyle and standard of living would be treated
strictly as a matter of private consumption that is irrelevant to the in-
come tax. The natural result of such a system would be that, to the ex-
tent they chose to do so, the childless couple would enjoy a standard of
living far superior to that of the larger family. Although the same amount
of income would be available to the taxable unit in either case, for the
larger family, that income would be spread across a greater number of
people. However, under this approach, how that income is distributed is
a consumption decision controlled by the taxpayers.
This result violates our intuitive notions of fairness. Once we accept
that family living arrangements and family planning decisions are not
pure consumption choices, fairness demands that we afford each person
an equal opportunity to pursue the lifestyle that his or her income-level
makes possible. That is, one principle of tax equity provides that indi-
viduals with an ability to maintain the same standard of living should
remain on an equal footing with respect to one another after taxes."
147. Id. at 363.
148. Gerard Brannon, Commentary, in TAXING THE FAMILY 104 (Rudolph G. Penner ed.,
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The pre-tax standard of living should be identically proportional to the
after-tax standard of living for all taxpayers.
This argument supports income splitting of the entire economic
household for tax purposes. Family income splitting, such as that ccn-
templated in the French tax code, clearly takes into account how many
people share in the family's income. Although there is no explicit de-
pendency credit to provide a shelter for subsistence-level income, the
zero tax bracket functions in the same way-for each member of the
family, the zero tax bracket identifies a fixed amount of income that is
not subject to taxation, presumably to allow for some minimum standard
of living. Economies of scale and real spending patterns might only re-
quire partial income splitting, whereas full income splitting would be
overly generous.
The current U.S. tax code does have an element of lifestyle ac-
knowledgment in that the greatest tax savings for dependents go to the
highest earning taxpayers, if we ignore the phaseout. Higher-earning tax-
payers are more likely, although not certain, to spend more in supporting
their dependents than are lower-earning taxpayers. Under the discretion-
ary income argument, dependency exemptions should be universally ap-
plicable to taxpayers of all incomes: having a child reduces a taxpayer's
available income by a certain amount regardless of her income level; and
this limitation of ability to pay should be reflected in the tax calculation.
Not only do the current exemptions have differing values for taxpayers in
different brackets, the current tax code also phases out exemptions for
taxpayers with higher incomes. As a result, a high-earning family of six
with a certain income will pay the same tax as a childless couple with the
same income. This'provision is inconsistent-to the extent we really be-
lieve dependents affect taxpayers' ability, we should be committed to re-
flecting that in the tax code for everyone or not at all. These provisions
obviously reflect the constraints of increased revenue pressures rather
than any coherent policy; an only partially redeeming theoretical justifl-
cation may be that as income rises, the proportional impact on discre-
tionary income of dependents decreases and eventually becomes negligi-
ble.
Zelenak identifies the control and benefit principles of income taxa-
tion as critical to determining whether the tax code should take into a-
count how many people must share in discretionary income in calculat-
ing the tax.149 Under the control and benefit principles, income attribu-
tion-that is, determining to whom a particular item of income has ac-
1983).
149. Zelenak, supra note 28, at 372-73.
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crued--is the key to taxation. Under the control principle, income is
attributed and taxed to the person who controls the income because the
disposal of that income is considered to be at the sole discretion of that
individual. 5' Under the benefit principle, income is attributed and taxed
to the person who consumes and benefits from the income because that
person is clearly enriched by that income.1 51 These principles rely on a
model of individual taxation that puts enormous pressure on the assign-
ment of income. Zelenak concludes that neither principle is obviously
superior, but the control principle "has an edge"'52 because the Supreme
Court in Earl53 declared control the touchstone for determining the
proper taxpayer and because the basic tax is an income tax, not a cmn-
154sumption tax.
The control principle in current tax jurisprudence is largely driven
by a scheme of individual taxation that puts enormous pressure on de-
termining to whom items of income should be ascribed. Individual taxa-
tion combined with progressive taxation creates tremendous incentives
to engage in income shifting-retaining control and, presumably, some
benefit from income and income-producing property while giving away
formal title. In that context, the control principle became an important
check to preserve the progressivity and integrity of the taxation system. If
the United States moves to a system of family taxation, control dimin-
ishes in importance in calculating the amount of tax, although it remains
important in determining on whom to impose tax liability. Even under
the current system, devotion to the control principle is clearly limited; for
example, the kiddie tax taxes a child's income to the child at the parents'
highest marginal rate. Therefore, it is an overstatement of the case to
identify a principled commitment to the concept of control in our current
income tax system.
The traditional approach to taxation is to attribute income on the
basis of control, but that idea is borrowed from property law rather inher-
ent to the taxation system. Property rules should not dictate tax rules;
property rules do not necessarily track social and legal economic obliga-
tions, ability to enjoy income, or ability to pay tax. 5 Sources and benefi-
150. Steuerle, supra note 34, at 81.
151. Michael J. McIntyre and Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and
Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1577 (1977).
152. Zelenak, supra note 28, at 373.
153. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
154. Zelenak, supra note 28, at 373. This argument for avoiding presumptions of sharing and
for abolishing the joint return is also set forth in Pamela Gann, supra note 70.
155. It is interesting to observe that the same system that some commentators see as disem-
powering women by depriving them of control, other commentators see as burdening men by
1999
Duquesne Law Review
ciaries of income may not be the same for tax purposes. Property rules
may be irrelevant within the family. The phenomenon of income shifting
demonstrates that formal title is unimportant within families in many
cases. The beneficial interest of shifted income is shared regardless of title
or shifted income displaces income that would otherwise come from the
family's joint income pool for the benefit of the titleholder. The family's
financial position is not diminished when income shifting occurs. The
system should focus on the beneficial interests of each spouse or family
member in the pool of income available for consumption or savings.
However, property interests are important for determining total resources
available to the family unit-sharing across family or household lines is
limited. In addition, property rules are significant from an administrative
perspective and must be accounted for in some way.
The control and benefit principles are not mutually exclusive: in
determining ability to pay, it is reasonable to take into account the num-
ber of people who will consume from a fixed amount of income; in as-
signing liability for paying the tax, it is reasonable to determine who actu-
ally controls income and is in a position to pay the tax. Although the
concept of control is used in several places in the tax code to determine
the appropriate taxpayer, control is not the only significant concept in
allocating tax liabilities. The current tax system's joint return and de-
pendent exemptions assume shared consumption, even if control is not
shared. Although not every member of the household may share equally
in determining how household resources are distributed, all members may
be taken into account in determining the tax liability. Taking all men-
bers into account does not, however, force us to impose liability equally
on all dependents. Rather, it is entirely appropriate to tax and hold re-
sponsible for paying the tax the person who actually does control the re-
sources.'56 The person who actually controls the household resources is
the one who will be able to pay the tax.
Moreover, the control principle is not inherent to an income tax.
Income and consumption are conceptually linked in our tax literature:
under the widely accepted Haig-Simons definition, income can be put to
one of two uses, consumption or savings. A taxpayer's income is the sum
of her consumption and her savings. Savings is primarily discretionary,
whereas consumption has both volitional and necessary components.
Thus, determination of a taxpayer's ability to pay for income tax purposes
that takes into account some element of consumption is not contradic-
forcing control upon them. Compare Kornhauser, supra note 56, with McIntyre and Oldman,
supra note 151, at 1592.
156. See Staudt, supra note 56.
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tory or inconsistent.
To some extent "income tax" is just a label and income is really a
proxy for other principles, namely ability to pay. The current tax system
in the United States mixes elements of an income tax and a consumption
tax. A strict income tax would eliminate many deductions and all tax
expenditures. Although it is true that we have chosen to view income as
representing ability to pay, income remains shorthand for much more
complex and subtle notions. To dismiss the benefit principle as inconsis-
tent with an income tax because it considers consumption is short-
sighted and overly doctrinal.
In the 1970s, McIntyre and Oldman noted that tax theorists had
failed to develop an ideal around which to design a comprehensive re-
form of the taxation of the family."' 7 They opined that the tax rules were
rife with "internal confficts, petty distinctions, and historical abnormali-
ties."' 8 In the twenty-plus years since their observation, most of the rules
to which they objected have remained intact.
McIntyre and Oldman argued for the benefit principle of taxation as
a fair and principled method of attributing income and computing tax
burdens while taking into consideration family burdens.'59 Under the
benefit principle, the person who benefits from or uses the income is the
recipient of the income for economic purposes and is actually taxed on
the income. The benefit principle focuses on who is actually enriched by
a given unit of income. If income is spent for the benefit or enjoyment of
one taxpayer, then that person is the appropriate assignee of that income
regardless of the source or control of the income. Whether by accident or
design, the benefit principle is present in the current income tax to a
limited extent, principally in the joint return, and does have theoretical
support.
Under the Haig-Simons definition of income, which is generally ac-
cepted throughout the tax literature, the proper tax base for an income
tax is the sum of the market value of the consumption of the taxpayer
and the net change in her savings. Under the benefit principle, the tax is
imposed by looking at each individual taxpayer's Haig-Simons equation
and linking each taxpayer with items of income she either consumes or
saves, regardless of its source. Consumption results in benefit, which, in
turn, yields increased economic well-being. Thus, income distributions of
the aggregated family income within the family are the key to allocating
tax liability under the benefit principle.
157. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 151, at 1573.
158. Id. at 1574.
159. Id. at 1575-77.
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There are three ways to apply the benefit principle: (1) tax to each
member of the family that income actually consumed by that member of
the family; (2) treat the family as a unit; or (3) attribute income by fcr-
mula to the members of the family group. To estimate income distribu-
tions within the family, McIntyre and Oldman supported income split-
ting for married taxpayers and individual filing for singles. Their proposal
was based on the assumption of pooling by married couples, but they pre-
sented no empirical evidence.16 They characterized marriage as a real
change in economic circumstances and believed that a 50-50 split was
"realistic and administratively reasonable." They also argued that the
dependency deduction is not a refinement of the tax base; rather, it is a
good, albeit limited, device for assigning income to the person who can-
sumes it.
Thus, the benefit principle, or consumption unit, approach can
properly play a role in determining income taxation of families. The ccn-
sumption unit approach is both theoretically sound and practically work-
able. To some extent, the choice of principle comes down to a sense of
fairness; as McIntyre and Oldman note, the benefit principle "seems in-
tuitively more equitable.4 6 The family share system implements the
benefit principle by estimating income distributions within the family and
taxing each family member's share separately.
The family share system is not a radical new way of understanding
income; rather, it is a refinement of the tax base. The family share system
is a method of taking family responsibilities into account rather than es-
signing tax liability to individuals or imputing income to individuals.
Thus, we can estimate the increased benefit and burden on the family or
household as the result of the addition of each family member by treating
each addition as a consumption unit taking up a certain proportion of the
aggregated household income. The income of each person who is ac-
cepted as a consumption unit within the household must also be aggre-
gated with that of the household or economic unit. It is more realistic to
treat people as household or family economic units rather than as indi-
viduals because they share consumption and make interrelated cn-
sumption decisions. The value of a given amount of income must depend
on how many people must share in that income-a dollar amount taken
by itself without considering family responsibilities is meaningless. In ad-
dition, under Haig-Simons, taking projected consumption patterns into
account is consistent with an income tax because income and consump-
tion are directly related. Whether the U.S. system accepts the benefit
160. Id. at 1578.
161. McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 151, at 1577.
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principle or approaches it as a method of refining the tax base, the
French family share system is consonant with our basic tax principle of
taxing according to ability.
The formula for calculating the tax must then determine the ccn-
sumption burden imposed by each family member. As discussed supra,
treating each family member as one consumption unit would be overly
generous and economically inaccurate. To the extent that we are trying
to move to a more accurate system, we should take into account real
patterns of family income sharing. Empirical study and administrability
are both essential to assigning consumption coefficients to obtain an ecu-
nomically valid result. The French system reflects one implementation of
the family share system, but alternative implementations through al-
justment of family coefficients are possible.
Under the French system, the same rate table is applied to each
share of taxable income. Thus, for each unit of consumption, some al-
lowance is made by the zero tax bracket for subsistence-level needs. The
discretionary income available to each family consumption unit is sub-
jected to tax under the graduated tax scale. The tax system allows for the
same standard of living for each member of the household. Under the
strict benefit principle, the tax so calculated would be taxed to each
member of the family individually. However, the French system takes a
step away from the principle of individual taxation and, employing a heu-
ristic to determine the economic equivalence of the household, taxes the
household as a whole. The tax per consumption unit is multiplied by the
number of consumption units equivalent to adults to determine the total
household tax; the head of the household or husband and wife are jointly
liable for paying the tax so calculated. Some suggest a more nuanced ap-
proach than applying the same rate table to the income allocated to each
member of the household; for example, applying separate rate schedules
for adults and children, with the brackets of the children's table set pro-
portionately as wide as the amount of household income allocated to
them.162 Even under such an approach, the result is similar to the French
approach, which effectively results in applying one set of graduated rates
for all households but varying the brackets to adjust for family size.
We can imagine a more sophisticated system that would take into
account variations for the children of different ages and the precise
economies of scale of having additional children or living in particular
family arrangements. However economically accurate such a system
would be, its appeal quickly diminishes with the realization that such an
162. Zelenak, supra note 28, at 377-78.
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attempt may not be any more exact in practice for any given family than
is the French approach, at the cost of considerable introduction of addi-
tional complexity. Should the United States choose to implement such a
system, the French method of calculating the tax is flexible enough to
allow for an easy transition. A much more precise, detailed table of family
shares for additional family members based on age and relationship could
replace the current family share schedule. The concern for simplicity jus-
tifies the possible under- or over-inclusiveness of bright line rules.
The size of the zero rate bracket is clearly difficult to define. If sub-
sistence-level income is to be exempt from taxation then the federal pov-
erty guidelines may provide a reference for the tax code. However, politi-
cal necessity may make it impossible to carry through even a rhetorical
commitment to exempting subsistence-level income. Subsistence is obvi-
ously ill defined for practical purposes, and calculating subsistence
thresholds is more of an art than a science. Many commentators believe
that current poverty definitions are woefully inadequate and that many
people who are not officially identified as living in poverty do, in fact, live
in extremely impoverished circumstances.'63 Determining the size of the
zero bracket is a policy decision that Congress must make, in addition to
defining the entire rate table based on reasonable tax rates, economic
efficiency, and revenue concerns.
C. Should We Take Family Burdens Into Account through Sharing?:
Empirical Considerations
Some scholars have defended the use of the family as a classification
by developing academic treatments of the family. One economic theory
of the family conceptualizes the family as a locus of economic productiv-
ity."6 The family is an essential economic unit within which bargaining
and specialization take place. The family is a "spending or utilizing unit"
in the larger economy and is likely to perceive itself as a unit.'65 Because
163. PATRICIA RUGGLES, DRAWING THE LINE: ALTERNATIVE POVERTY MEASURES AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 20 (1990).
164. GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991).
165. Dulude, supra note 90, at 73. Although the household production model itself has gen-
erated criticism for over generalizing and treating the household as having a single utility func-
tion that is maximized by all members of the unit rather than treating the members of the
household as individuals with separate utility functions. More sophisticated approaches focus on
bargaining that takes place within the household between members in order to allocate re-
sources to individuals, not necessarily in an equal or even fair distribution. Nevertheless, these
approaches all treat the household as a site of important economic production and locate the
household within the market economy rather than outside of or beside it, and may best be seen
as refining the idea rather than rejecting it altogether. See, e.g., Yoram Ben-Porath, Economics
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of its economic significance, the family must be recognized as more than
simply a lifestyle or consumption choice. A sociological theory of the
family understands the family as a source of stability, behavior control,
and reward and punishment to "coerce" socially desirable behavior."6 As
such, the family is separate from other social groupings. Such models im-
plicitly and explicitly acknowledge the interdependence of the members
of the household and the interrelationships between the economic status
and resources and standard of living of the household. In the law, the
family has been treated as a sort of "black box" with a unity of purpose
and social presence."' Tax law, for example, denies the productive value
of housework by failing to tax imputed income. As families become in-
creasingly less structured, scholars question the validity of family as a
classification upon which significant legal consequences are based. Em-
pirical observation is one approach to counteract the uncertainty of theo-
retical models, which may or may not hold true in reality.
The French system of taxation assumes a high level of sharing in
treating families as economic units. The assumption of sharing between
family members and even between married couples has been questioned
by several scholars in recent years. One growing critique of the joint re-
turn is the concern about faulty assumptions of marital sharing. Within
families, for a given dollar of income, who has achieved that dollar may
actually matter. Nothing in law requires sharing or limits patterns of
sharing16 and evidence shows that sharing resists generalizations.'69 Most
notably in the tax literature, Kornhauser has reviewed the existing en-
pirical evidence, including her own study, and concluded that evidence
of sharing is inadequate to warrant a sharing-based taxation system.
Empirical studies on family spending are difficult to conduct for a
number of reasons. It is hard to measure allocations in household and to
allocate values of shared goods. The variety and creativity of family eo-
nomic arrangements defy study and characterization, even when family
and the Family--Match or Mismatch?, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 52 (1982); Marilyn Manser and Murray
Brown, Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis, 21 INT'L ECON. REV. 31,
31-44 (1980).
166. See David Haddock and Daniel Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, WASH. U. L. Q.
15 (1996).
167. Silbaugh, supra note 56, at 25-27. Silbaugh identifies and discusses several areas in which
the family has been treated as a single unit within which the law refuses to interfere, including
marital contracts and marital obligations, estates and bankruptcy.
168. Id. at 51-52.
169. See Viviana A. Zelizer, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994); Judith Siegel, Money
and Marriage: A Transparency to the Struggles of Intimacy, 4 J. INDEP. SOC. WORK 51 (1990);
Diana Wong, The Limits of Using the Household as a Unit of Analysis, in HOUSEHHOLDS AND THE
WORLD ECONOMY 56-63 Uoan Smith et al. eds., 1984).
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living arrangements are relatively simple. Financial arrangements may be
heavily nuanced and poorly vocalized within families. The lack of a udn-
versal language or cultural ethic regarding money makes the investigation
into patterns of economic behavior within families even more difficult.
Moreover, family members often have very different understandings
about the same arrangements.
Consequently, family economics-the control, sharing, and con-
sumption of resources within the family-is not well understood. Given
the centrality of family economics to family life and the universal impcr-
tance of the subject, the paucity of information on the topic is surprising.
Which type of sharing-control or consumption-should be designated
as "true sharing" and determinative of ability to pay is an open question.
The meaning of sharing may not always be clear, but sharing presumably
requires agreement to a general arrangement of joint and interdependent
decision making for household economic decisions rather than consulta-
tion on every issue. 170 Arrangements may be so complex, nuanced, and
unexamined that perceptions vary widely; therefore, analysis of control,
coercion, independence, and sharing is inconclusive and of questionable
significance.
Under the control approach to income taxation, income should be
taxed to those who earn and control the income rather than those who
consume or benefit from the income. Under the control approach, shar-
ing is immaterial. In contrast, under the benefit approach, sharing is es-
sential to determining economic well-being. Alstott defines this distinc-
tion between control and benefit of income as the difference between
psychic or emotional well-being and material or financial well-being.1
7 '
For tax purposes, the primary focus should be on material well-being,
although, as discussed, the tax system does codify important values that
should be considered before enacting any rule. To the extent that en-
pirical evidence demonstrates that sharing does not occur within house-
holds, the joint return and income sharing are inappropriate measures of
ability to pay and individual taxation more closely approximates income.
Spouses exhibit four basic patterns of sharing income, and, thus,
some scholars argue, no one arrangement can be assumed. The four pat-
terns are as follows: (1) the husband controls the entire household in-
come; (2) the husband controls the household income but provides a
regular allowance to the wife, either for household expenses or for her
own personal spending; (3) the spouses pool their household income with
joint control; and (4) each spouse has individual control of his or her
170. Alstott, supra note 56, at 2027-28.
171. Id.
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separate income."' These four patterns are all differentiated by control,
rather than by benefit. Families are hierarchical groups in which one or
two members control allocation and use of money for the benefit of the
entire household."' Although control may vary across households, con-
sumption and benefit are much more likely to be relatively uniform and
to predict ability to pay. Families may follow different dominant patterns
of income control but may have exactly the same family arrangement and
ability to pay and may pursue the same lifestyle.
Women's control over money is linked to marital status and the
family's income level.'74 In particular, women who are wage earners,
heads of household, or members of low-income families may have much
larger roles in controlling resources and decision making as a result of a
combination of opportunity and necessity. Gender roles may be much
more fluid in low-income families in which roles are driven and formed
by need rather than by choice or conventional social expectations.
Furthermore, the concern about income distribution within the
couple seems to assume that the income tax burden is equally divided; in
reality, income, control, and consumption may not be equally divided. It
is not clear why such liability should not be apportioned between the
members of the marital unit according to ability to pay. Indeed, formulae
for such apportionment have been considered by tax scholars. Silbaugh
has made one argument for why such apportionment might not occur-
women perform a disproportionate amount of housework, which, as a
public good, benefits all members of the household and not merely the
worker; in contrast, market earnings can be preserved for the exclusive
use of the earner. However, there is no evidence that women do bear a
disproportionate amount of tax burden within the household, and indi-
vidual filing is likely to exacerbate, rather than solve, the problem if it
exists by discouraging pooling of income, which would be beneficial to
homemakers. Staudt also argues that families do not act as a unit and do
not benefit uniformly from lack of taxing imputed income. She supports
looking at the economic position of each member of the family individu-
ally and expresses particular concern about evidence that women do not
have meaningful control over family resources or a role in economic dei-
sion making. Gann argues that the joint return overestimates pooling and
underestimates the importance of separate property rights.'75 If a woman
has little control over family income, it is unclear how individual filing
172. Dulude, supra note 90, at 89.
173. Zelizer, supra note 169.
174. For a good summary discussion, see Staudt, supra note 56, at 1595-96.
175. Gann, supra note 70, at 7.
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would promote control directly; the effects would be an indirect and sub-
tle result of defining an alternative norm of behavior and symbolic inde-
pendence of women.
Although control and explicit sharing are difficult to determine
through direct inquiry, considering the type of consumption most house-
holds engage in, shared consumption must be the norm. A majority of
family expenses are spent on items that are shared by the household; e.g.,
food, shelter, utilities, automobiles, and vacations."6 Furthermore, items
that are not required to be shared by their nature are often provided to
household members at the same standard. For example, it is unlikely that
one member of the household will dress in Armani and relegate the oth-
ers to dressing from thrift shops.
Any bright line rule concerning family sharing embodied in the tax
code will be either under- or over-inclusive of actual sharing and eco-
nomic distributions within families. That is the nature of bright line rules.
However, administrative efficiency and fairness require uniformity and
simplicity. Internal family dynamics are difficult to evaluate. Despite the
paucity of evidence, pooling and proportional sharing seem to be reascn-
able assumptions. Except in the rare case, substantial sharing will occur
as a practical matter, regardless of whether sharing is explicitly consid-
ered. As noted earlier, income shifting also provides empirical evidence
that sharing does occur within families without regard for legal title. The
fact remains that economic decisions made within the family must neces-
sarily be interdependent. Family economic decisions are a function of the
resources available and the economic demands of other family members.
Furthermore, the demands of other family members are roughly based on
the number of adult equivalents in the household. The family share sys-
tem is an appropriate method of estimating sharing and economic bur-
dens for purposes of taxation. The family acts as a unit and should be
treated as such.
D. Advantages of the French Model and Proposed Extensions
The French family quotient system offers several advantages over
the present U.S. system of family taxation; however, the French system is
not a panacea for all of the ills that have been attributed to the U.S. tax
code. The most significant reason to move to the family quotient system
is the existence of a consistent and cogent theoretical rationale. The
family quotient system is based on economic reality. It is a comprehensive
176. U.S. Bureau of the Census, supra note 1, at 450-51, 456-57, tbls 695-96, 703-04.
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method of giving the tax code economic meaning. A logical approach to
income taxation lends the system legitimacy and provides guidance for
legislative policy and a check against arbitrariness and manipulation.
Focusing on the family unit is desirable because it is more accurate
in many cases in which an individual's income does not indicate his or
her other resources and financial responsibilities. Determining economic
well being requires a broader perspective. The family share system im-
plements such a comprehensive perspective.
Another advantage of the family quotient system, a direct result of
theoretical unity, is its conceptual and practical simplicity."' Taxpayers
are more likely to respect and abide by a tax code that is internally con-
sistent and understandable and that reflects their own economic experi-
ence and intuitions. Furthermore, employing the family as the taxable
unit will eliminate provisions in the code designed to prevent income
shifting. These are among the most difficult provisions to understand and
to administer. If all members of the family are taxed together, all income
of the family is considered together and shifting income to other family
members becomes meaningless for tax purposes. To the extent that in-
come shifting occurs beyond the bounds of the taxable unit, it will con-
tinue; however, income shifting outside the family is restricted by the
practical limitation that shifting income outside the economic unit makes
it difficult for the unit to recapture benefit after surrendering control
This simplification is also likely to promote tax equity by eliminating ad-
vantages to taxpayers who do engage in forms of income shifting.
The family quotient system will also eliminate the marriage penalty
from the tax rate structures. To the extent that certain deductions are
limited by taxable unit rather than by individual, some marriage penalties
will occur. However, these can be eliminated by adjusting deduction
ceilings and floors for taxable units based on size and structure. The mar-
riage bonus remains for couples in which one spouse earns a dispropcr-
tionate amount of the family income. As discussed, no system can cn-
pletely reconcile progressivity, marriage neutrality, and couples neutrality.
Eliminating the marriage penalty alleviates the most objectionable Os-
pects of marriage non-neutrality in the tax code. Couples neutrality is
more important than marriage neutrality because couples do differ in
their economic functions from individuals.
The French taxation system will not eliminate, but will mitigate, the
secondary earner bias. By broadening the tax brackets, the family quo-
tient system flattens progressivity and reduces the marginal rates expei-
177. Admittedly, the notion of simplicity in a functional tax code must necessarily be relative.
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enced by secondary earners. The family quotient system is more gener-
ous to those who file as couples by allowing income averaging. However,
in any progressive system with joint taxation, an additional earner will
reach higher marginal rates faster than will a "primary" earner. How that
accelerated progressivity is characterized is largely a question of percep-
tion; an accurate economic analysis would allocate tax burdens between
family earners rather than automatically assuming the highest rates on
the secondary earner. As discussed, many of the factors contributing to
secondary earner bias are not within the realm of taxation.
The EITC is, to some extent, a separate system that will not be di-
rectly addressed by moving to a family share system. By widening tax
brackets and providing for a subsistence level of tax free income, the
family share system could bring significant tax relief to lower income
workers such that the EITC will not be necessary.
Although the French system provides an excellent model for reform,
certain extensions of the family quotient system would create a fairer,
more accommodating tax system. First, taxable unit treatment should be
extended to all economic households, to the extent possible, regardless of
marital status and other superficial or arbitrary distinctions. Second, the
definition of dependent used in the U.S. tax code, which is more expm-
sive and economics based than is the French definition of dependent,
should be retained.
Wolk has proposed tax recognition of domestic partnerships for un-
married couples who pool income and share property.1 78 Marriage is an
appropriate signifier of a certain type of economic relationship and is a
valid criterion for special tax treatment despite its changing meaning;
however, marriage is an under-inclusive criterion. The family share sys-
tem should apply to all economic families that share income. Any other
approach would fall short, as the joint return does, of being a full imple-
mentation of the splitting rationale and would be of questionable legiti-
macy. Substance should be emphasized over form and artificial distinc-
tions should be eschewed; the focus should be on the substance of rela-
tionships, caretaking, and interdependence rather than on formalistic but
unreal definitions.
The problem with expanding the definition of fiscal household is in
identifying those cohabitation relationships that are similar to the em-
nomic and familial characteristics of marriage. To the extent that co-
178. Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unnarried Cohabi-
tants, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1240 (1980). Although Wolk focuses on wealth transfers between
unmarried singles rather than on overall family tax consequences and the joint return, much of
the underlying analysis of appropriate tax units is appropriate for our purposes.
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habitants are pooling their resources, labor, and decision making, they
are more like families than like individuals from an economic perspective.
We need to develop an economic definition of marriage as alternative
social arrangements become more acceptable and widespread. For exam-
ple, to acknowledge unmarried couples as a taxable unit, we could re-.
quire a familial relationship, perceived by others, and of substantial dua-
tion 79 Cohabitation is one critical criterion for forming an identifiable
economic unit, however, we would probably wish to avoid treating as a
unit those who share living arrangements yet act as independent ew-
nomic units for other purposes; college roommates supported by their
families are not an economic family for our purposes. One response
would be to require a time threshold, perhaps eighteen months to two
years (waived if the cohabitants marry or have a child together) to reccg-
nize non-familial households as tax units. Specific exceptions for those
sharing living quarters only could be developed. Marriage as a deterni-
nant of tax status could be discarded altogether and the same time re-
quirements could apply to married couples. By moving away from the
heterosexual married couple model embodied in the current code, the
fiscal household designation could be granted to same-sex couples or
adult siblings living together. A bright line rule is necessary to avoid in-
vestigation of transitory relationships, prevent abuse of tax code, and
prevent illusory pooling to undermine progressivity.
The current U.S. tax code's definition of dependent is preferable to
the French approach of enumerating a very narrow class of individuals
who may be treated as dependents. Dependency is essentially an eco-
nomic relationship. We should follow the same pattern of assigning the
family coefficient but apply it to a wider class of dependents. Particularly
when increasingly complex but equally valid economic arrangements
proliferate, a narrow definition is economically inaccurate and discour-
ages private support of extended family members, elderly parents, and
disabled individuals.
Moving to a family share system with relatively generous family al-
lowances will implicate revenue concerns. The family share system is
flexible enough to allow rate setting determined by revenue goals. Nev-
ertheless, such a system is likely to bring in much less than the current
system and may need to be supplemented with a VAT, which would re-
flect an explicit move to a consumption tax system.




Any attempt at a comprehensive consideration of an alternative to
the U.S. personal income taxation system reveals the complex consid-
erations that must be reconciled to reach a solution. A number of issues
with differing solutions are presented under the umbrella of family taxa-
tion. A survey of the existing literature advocating reform of the U.S. tax
system makes it clear that piecemeal fixes may satisfy only narrow objec-
tives at the expense of other equally important objectives. There is no
consensus on priorities in the design of a tax system, and certain goals,
although, it is hoped, not certain values, must be compromised. Individ-
ual filing has the appeal of theoretical simplicity and the illusion of
equality for all taxpayers; however, it denies the reality of the experiences
of many Americans and introduces additional complexity to maintain the
fiction of individual economic units.
The French system provides an intriguing model for an alternative
system of personal income taxation that acknowledges the living ar-
rangements and financial responsibilities of taxpayers in a rational and
conceptually consistent manner. The French system represents a prind-
pled yet flexible approach that is able to accommodate policy and other
considerations. The definition of family or household for purposes of de-
termining taxable unit should be reconsidered to meet the needs of
changing families. As Bittker notes, if Congress yields to the temptation
to conform to trends, it runs the risk that both the trends and the tax
code will become obsolete.' 0 Trends should be distinguished from real
social change. Reform demands easy, flexible, and objective, but not a-
bitrary, criteria that are tied to notions of fairness. The French model
represents a viable alternative for serious tax reform and an overhaul of
our existing system that goes beyond discrete, isolated concerns.
180. Boris Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L.REv. 1389, 1392
(1975).
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